Porto’s Lopetegui and Diego Reyes: the art of scapegoating

The argument goes that Mexican defender Diego Reyes was so lacking in confidence and out of position in such a tough scenario that his permanence on the pitch in Allianz Arena dangerously compromised Porto’s interests. Reyes, who, playing as a centre-back, nullified the likes of Leandro Damiao, Oscar and Neymar during the 2012 Olympics final, had just had 477 minutes in seven matches prior to his lineup and, to make things worse, was deployed in the ‘unfamiliar’ right-back spot. By the 33 minutes of the first half, already 3-0 down to Bayern, Julen Lopetegui would have realized his own mistake and subbed Reyes off for natural right-back Ricardo. 

Two more home side goals were to follow in the remaining 12 minutes.

The key to deconstruct such a shallow argument is to analyze events in the first half. For events I mean what Bayern’s attacks were about and not what Reyes did individually (a defender can complete brilliant stats and defend poorly a single set piece that screws up all his previous work). In this respect, this graph about Bayern’s created chances -blue arrows represent passes which lead to shots and yellow arrows represent goal assistances- is very eloquent:

(First half, taken from FourFourTwo's StatsZone)

As seen, the overwhelming bulk of Bayern’s attacks were carried across the heart of Porto’s midfield and Porto’s left side; that is, through the inside play of Thomas Mueller and Robert Lewandowski, and the outside play of Philipp Lahm. Indeed, when still at 0-0, the Pole had hit the goalkeeper’s far post after a quick interior combination with Mueller that showed how easy Bayern could dismantle the away midfield. Remarkably, what the graph also shows is that Porto’s right side just conceded a single created chance (the 1-0 by Thiago Alcántara); the flank covered by Diego Reyes initially and Ricardo subsequently.

The deconstruction of Bayern’s opener illustrates the actual pattern of Porto’s misery. In the one hand, seen from the perspective of a man-marking system, Diego Reyes stuck to Mario Goetze, Bayern’s left winger, and Ricardo Quaresma had to track back Bayern’s left full-back Juan Bernat. In spite that Reyes stuck tight to Goetze when he charged forward inside the box, Bernat was free to cross for Alcántara’s surprise surge. Albeit centre-back Maicon was really poor at Alcántara’s header, he can defend himself by arguing that the Spanish-Brazilian midfielder, again in a man-marking system, was left absolutely uncovered by Héctor Herrera. If, on the other hand, Porto’s system was zonal-marking, then Reyes should have been stationed on Porto’s right flank but then Goetze would be left free to go inside and able to provoke overloads in a far more dangerous zone for Porto. Man-marking or zonal-marking, the Portuguese side was thoroughly outplayed from the birth of Bayern’s attacks.

In other words, Lopetegui’s tactical plan (if one other than sitting very deep did exist) was a total disaster. One should contemplate and hail the Bayern Munich brilliance and Guardiola’s tactical masterclass over a side that almost self-destructed from the show given at Do Dragao. But, if your first reaction as a manager, when you see your side opened up in the midfield and the left side, is to make a straight swap in the right-back spot you are clearly trying to absurdly blame one single component of your system for its wholesale failure.

And that is scapegoating. Diego Reyes now at least knows that Champions League football sometimes implies lumping silently with despotic tyrants.

Danubio, the poorest and most loser side in Libertadores?

Commonsense in football journalism says it's ill-advised to write about poor and loser sides in any given competition; unless, of course, the poor and loser is a big club whose misery illustrates decadence and deterioration. Uruguayan side Danubio FC qualified to this Libertadores as reigning champions of their domestic league, and yet, their continental record this year can't be poorer: all games lost, the bottom place of their group already guaranteed with one match to go, fourteen goals conceded.

Having watched all of Danubio's losses so far, however, something keeps telling me I'll regret it for long if the chance to write about them is simply let pass by. That is because Danubio is not a poor and loser side: it is merely a too young one, if not entirely juvenile, that ran with the awful luck of being seeded within this Libertadores's Group of Death along current monarchs San Lorenzo and Paulista powerhouses Corinthians and Sao Paulo FC. In any other group, the odds could have been rather good to make a decent stage and even dream with progression.

Their boss, Leonardo Ramos, went bold and courageous enough as to field a three-man defensive line in which the most experienced member was the sweeper, Matías de los Santos, with just 22 years old. To the latter's right was Federico Ricca, 20 years old, and to the left was Cristian González, 18. When De los Santos was unavailable, Ramos picked Joaquín Pereyra, 20.

Training Athletic de Bilbao, Marcelo Bielsa used to say that, as a coach, it was cynical to field youngsters in order to expose and prove them unable to compete in tough scenarios. Well, in the case of Danubio, Cristian González endured a true nightmare in Montevideo trying to cover Corinthians' experienced striker Paolo Guerrero. The Peruvian himself had endured a difficult first half under the supervision of impressive Federico Ricca; by the second half though, Guerrero moved towards González and Corinthians finally found the path to victory in Uruguay. What did Leo Ramos do afterwards? He gave confidence to González and his young folks as undisputed starters for the subsequent matches.

Brazilian supporters of both Corinthians and Sao Paulo might cast my interpretation of Danubio as highly partial and over-romanticized as the Uruguayan side showed lots of dirtiness that went unpunished by apathetic referees. It is true. There is no innocence in their youth: with clenched teeth, more often than not the Danubio players indulged on unnecessary challenges and blatant aggressions which made many of them well-deserving of straight red cards. Killer children. Uruguayan ones who see in violence, either in physical, verbal, or in footballing terms, the only way to lift their club from the humbleness of the Uruguayan league and make it compete with South América's finest.

One feels he will regret not writing about the likes of Ricca, González and De lo Santos as they can well turn into the future Uruguayan centre-backs plying their trade in some European superclub. The same can also apply to the correct holding midfield duo of Fabricio Formiliano and Nicolás Milesi. Albeit Danubio is neither Peñarol nor Nacional (not even Defensor Sporting for that matter), notable former players include Marcelo Zalayeta, Álvaro Recoba and Edinson Cavani.

Danubio, the poorest and most loser side in Libertadores? Not at all, they are by far the most refreshing side in Libertadores and well worth watching them.

Osorio's Atlético Nacional goes conservative in La Plata

  The 3-3-4 formation which the Atlético Nacional de Medellín boss, Juan Carlos Osorio, deployed for the home match against Ecuadorean Barcelona de Guayaquil was indisputably the main factor behind the most vibrant Libertadores match so far. Atlético Nacional had thrown punch after punch, worked both the inside and the outside of the pitch to attack, showed energy and courage. And, at the end, nevertheless, the Ecuadoreans took the best out of the tactical imbalance of the Colombians and collected the three points with a 3-2 victory that uncovered the ugly face of Osorio's romanticism.

That ugly face was almost crystal-clear: those who should have been the wing-backs within a traditional 3-4-3, Venezuelan wingers Alejandro Guerra and Jonathan Copete, were pushed so high up that, while both helped to connect with the forward partnership of Pablo Zeballos and Luis Ruiz through their mobility and dribbling (Guerra was unstoppable on the right), the three-man defensive line and the holding midfield duo were left alone against Barcelona's 4-2-3-1. Sometimes, Atlético Nacional had a spare man on the back and often that wasn't enough as the opposition's attackers were faster on the counter. Therefore, it was easy for the Ecuadorean side to harm Atlético Nacional with simple transitions.

The romantic mistake was not to be repeated yesterday in the away game at La Plata versus former Valencia CF manager Mauricio Pellegrino's Estudiantes. Osorio moderated his approach, although 'moderate' might sound euphemistical if one considers that Atlético Nacional only managed to make one shot on target -the winner by Jonathan Mejía- during 90 minutes. Indeed, he went conservative by reverting to a typical 4-2-3-1 shape with four natural centre-backs (Murillo, Henríquez, Peralta and Nájera) in the back line. Osorio also dropped Zeballos and lined up Ruiz as the lone forward whereas Alejandro Guerra was fielded on the right wing and Mejía in the number ten role behind Ruiz himself.

Osorio's caution is illustrated in the above image: despite the fact that the eleven players of Estudiantes appear in a defensive 5-3-2 shape on their own half, just eight field players of Atlético Nacional appear in the offensive phase of the 4-2-3-1. That is, the centre-back pairing, Peralta and Henríquez, are on their own half with no one to mark and thus the system is quite cautious                      

Tellingly enough, the only goal of the match came from a quick counterattack in which Estudiantes' own wing-backs (Rosales and Álvaro Pereira) didn't track back with enough speed and hence the centre-back trio of Seba Domínguez, Jonathan Schunke and Leandro Desábato was exposed by the mobility of Ruiz making a great decoy run. And the lone Estudiantes holding midfielder, Gastón Gil, was easily beaten by Mejía as well as by Guerra a few minutes later for another dangerous Colombian attack.

What one can draw from Osorio's counterattacking strategy against Pellegrino is his faithfulness to the tactical textbook of conventional wisdom. When the opposition lines a centre-back trio, the textbook says, a lone striker is to be flanked by wingers on either side so they can drop to help in the midfield battle and this makes one of the enemy three centre-backs redundant. The opposition may have possession but will be vulnerable to counterattacks at pace as the wingers can surge and create one-on-one situations: exactly the same that Barcelona de Guayaquil did to Atlético Nacional in Colombia.

In order to equalize, Pellegrino also attempted to play textbook strategies by switching constantly to the many variants of 4-4-2 after half time, but his tactical shifts were frankly confusing. For instance, he deployed Seba Domínguez, a heavy defender now on his 34, on the right full-back spot to no offensive avail. Having observed Domínguez's situation, Pellegrino subbed him off for a classic Argentine trequartista, Román Martínez, and thus placed an otherwise young forward, Carlos Auzqui, on the void left by Domínguez's departure. Confusing and chaotic. Dominant but unable to penetrate.

By the final whistle, Osorio celebrated effusively, for his tactical and strategic shifts towards conservatism proved fruitful. This Colombian coach, who in other scenarios likes to make risky bets and produce enthralling football, is learning quick how to play round-robin tournaments with caution and patience.

Where is Ramón Díaz’s Paraguay heading to?

Back in the 2011 Copa América, what could have come as Paraguay’s most glorious day was instead the beginning of the end of the successful modern cycle of a nation that achieved successive World Cup classifications between 1998 and 2010. That afternoon, goals by Luis Suárez and Diego Forlán in the final in Buenos Aires piled-up to an easy 3-0 Uruguayan victory that bore witness to a perplexingly faint Gerardo Martino’s side. Arguably, that poor show just heralded what was to come: four different coaches in four years and the bottom place in South American qualifiers for Brazil 2014.

During that successful modern cycle Paraguay was never exactly the model of some sort of aesthetical football, but the blueprint of adamant tactical organization, ruthless finishing, and unforgiving braveness. It is somehow telling that, despite all the languid performances Paraguay put on during the qualifiers, in 2013 the team managed to collect a surprising 3-3 tie to Germany in a friendly match at Kaiserslautern. Although Joachim Loew lined up the likes of Mueller, Lahm, Khedira, Ozil and Reus, Paraguay always was on the lead and only a last-minute goal put the Germans level. The Guaraníes -as the Paraguayans are called for the country’s majority ethnic group- showed their lost pride and sheer guts at least one night on European soil.

As the 2015 Copa América fast approaches, however, the team’s perspectives look pretty uncertain. The Paraguayan Federation sacked Víctor Genes, the coach in charge for that German draw, and named Argentine boss Ramón Díaz in his place. For Pelado Díaz, this is his first job as coach of a national side being the case that his is a well established name in Argentina’s first division with River Plate and San Lorenzo de Almagro. Many Argentine pundits agree in saying that Díaz’s career has faded in recent times and he might be taking a country to reignite his career and thus resemble Gerardo Martino, who is now in charge of Argentina.

In his first two friendly matches Ramón Díaz has collected a goalless draw against Costa Rica in San José and a 1-0 loss to México in Kansas City. Notwithstanding cohesive play cannot be expected from the onset for a manager who landed on the job, Paraguay exhibited far too little basic football and far too much dirtiness. Consider the simultaneous debut of coach Gustavo Quinteros with Ecuador: Quinteros knows the Ecuadorean league, his tactical system does not represent a radical break from his predecessor, and he himself was bold enough to introduce some new players like Miller Bolaños and Ángel Mena. As a result, although Ecuador lost its friendly matches against México and Argentina, the play was fluent and fairly propositive.

Putting tactical issues aside, Díaz’s initial list of players included injury-prone Roque Santa Cruz -who did not play in either game- and a set of names from the Mexican league whose international value is either fading or yet to be proved. Paulo Da Silva, 35, might represent the first case; Édgar Pájaro Benítez, the second one. Oddly enough, Óscar Tacuara Cardozo, joint top-scorer in the Turkish league alongside Demba Bá, was omitted from these games. Omitted as well was young AS Roma’s Tonny Sanabria; FC Basel’s Derlis González was called but could not make it through legal issues.

Both Paraguay and Ramón Díaz are betting risky on this project: the federation is hiring a winning coach who, nevertheless, clearly does not know Paraguayan football in depth, and the coach who will lead a national side in transition for a Copa América which will feature better established teams like Ecuador, Venezuela, Chile and Uruguay. 

Perhaps, for now, the only thing Díaz needs to do is to restore Paraguay its unforgiving braveness and sheer guts.

What's behind Klinsmann's Mexican quest?

The current fuss in México's footballing environment raised by the call-ups to the US national team for Ventura Alvarado and William Yarbrough may make us neglect the serious troubles that Jurgen Klinsmann now has. Such are the limitations within US Soccer grassroots levels that the California-based German boss pursues a selection agenda based on foreign scouting and -you may wanna call it- free riding.

As tough as 'free riding' sounds, I believe the concept fits this situation. A good illustration of it is the fuss raised back in 2008 when Ivan Rakitic, amongst many other Swiss-born Croatian players, switched allegiance from Switzerland to Croatia. During that year's European Championships, co-organized by the former country, it wasn't uncommon to hear angry Swiss fans supporting every rival that the latter country had within the tournament. "The thing is that players like him (Rakitic) and Mladen Petric (former Dortmund and Hamburg striker) have benefited from our youth ranks system and also from playing in our clubs so they could jump to big Bundesliga sides and now, quite talented as they are, they turn their backs on us by playing for Croatia ", went the Swiss rant.

The scheme is the following: within a world of ever-increasing migration trends, a national federation whose domestic youth ranks system is unable to feed its national side with an adequate pool of eligible players must look for talent abroad by means of constant scouting. Of course, a constant foreign scouting program sometimes implies tug-of-wars with foreign federations, foreign clubs, foreign media and foreign egos.

When Mexico coach Miguel Herrera went unapologetic by remarking that the Club León goalkeeper Yarbrough was only one amongst other eight or nine Mexican goalies, he was in fact reflecting the big egocentrism that pervades Mexican football when it comes to players being lured by US Soccer: that's reminiscent of the cases of Francisco Torres and Edgar Castillo. When these players end up finding little to none playing time with the United States at major tournaments such as World Cups, Mexican pundits regard this as confirmation of an alleged lack of talent that wasn't worthy of consideration for the Mexican side in the first place. What it actually reflects, however, is that those Mexican-American Liga Mx players haven't followed a consistent youth process that enables them to compete against American players who have, and against American imports from Bundesliga and Eredivisie.

Indeed, the USMNT roster for the friendly games in Denmark and Switzerland is full of men scouted abroad: Aron Johannsson, Danny Williams, John Brooks, Tim Chandler, Alfredo Morales, Michael Orozco, Greg Garza, Fabian Johnson, Julian Green, plus the abovementioned Yarbrough and Alvarado. Homegrown talent (defined as individuals who both played for MLS youth ranks and US underage teams) accounts for hardly 12 out of 23 footballers. Almost a fifty-fifty proportion unthinkable for certain national sides such as Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia and Belgium.

Things were not always like this for Klinsmann. When he took over the national job, many good American players were plying their trade in the Premier League, Serie A and Jupiter League to name but a few European leagues. As soon as early 2014, nonetheless, the MLS began repatriation of those good players that everyone knows and the pool of eligible ones shrank dramatically.

Klinsmann's Mexican quest is actually an international quest that stands for a constant scouting program that sometimes turns into free riding, since the US grassroots levels are facing serious troubles which compromise the near future of the national squad. For foreign scouting should come as complementary to youth development, and not as a substitute.

Sao Paulo beats San Lorenzo using Brazilian tactics

   The stride hitherto perfect of Corinthians within Libertadores's group of death implies that the clashes between Sao Paulo FC and current monarchs San Lorenzo de Almagro will likely determine the second ticket to the cup's next stage. In the first round of this fight between Brazilians and Argentines, the Sao Paulo boss Muricy Ramalho resorted to the most Brazilian of formations: the 4-2-2-2, otherwise known as "the magic square", which allowed the home side to retain possession and generate width against an opposition that seemed happy with the finally foiled draw.

Edgardo Bauza, the coach who has lifted two Libertadores with Ecuadorean Liga de Quito and his current side, is renowned as a true pragmatist. For San Lorenzo -despite playing against a Sao Paulo currently struggling at the regional Paulista championship- executed the very same tactics that were deployed in Morocco against Real Madrid for the FIFA Club World Cup.  Two banks of four plus two forwards (4-4-2). The tactical surprises that defined the negativity of this approach were the lineup of holding midfielder Franco Mussis as a right winger to provide extra cover on that flank, and using Pablo Barrientos as the side's left winger. These surprises in turn meant very few upsurges by the more than decent full-backs Emmanuel Mas and Julio Buffarini. 

Sao Paulo, however, started with the usual 4-4-2 diamond formation which failed against Corinthians, but here it counted with the promising appearance of Alexandre Pato in one of the two center-forward spots alongside Luis Fabiano. It only took 40 seconds for Pato to drop to the right channel and cross for a brilliant Michel Bastos's header that hit the post. Sadly, Pato left the pitch through injury, replaced by Argentine Ricardo Centurión, whose trickery with the ball was paradoxically the only thing Brazilian for the rest of the first half.

                                                                                                                                                                 

             

Ramalho used that substitution to modify his formation, yet the change from midfield diamond to magic square wasn't straightforward as Bastos and Paulo Henrique Ganso switched flanks constantly. One did tell the implementation of the 4-2-2-2 because Bastos, being himself left-footed, played on the right flank for large spells of the second half (for his winner, the former Olympique Lyonnais man stayed abnormally wide and thus absolutely free of cover to attack goalkeeper Torrico's near post). The same applied in Ganso's movements: the two Sao Paulo wingers came inside from wide positions, overloaded the center of the pitch and produced ball possession; allowed the upsurges of the full-backs and stretched the attacking zone. Left full-back Carlinhos, undisputedly the man of the match, crossed for the winner and was quite close to open the score himself minutes earlier after receiving a brilliant through-ball by Ganso (see vine).

In spite of their cautious tactics, San Lorenzo had a couple of dangerous chances when Emmanuel Mas beat Sao Paulo's radically advanced defensive line and when substitute Leandro Romagnoli retained possession through dribbling. This illustrates the risks implicit to the magic square: it pushes the full-backs so high in the pitch that a simple long ball aimed towards the flanks is enough to counterattack at pace. In all likelihood Edgardo Bauza will modify his approach in Buenos Aires and introduce quick players on the flanks like Héctor Villalba and Gonzalo Verón.

The second ticket of the group of death is certainly still up for grabs although Sao Paulo holds a better hand: the draw benefits them and this should allow for a patient counterattacking strategy that gambles on San Lorenzo's desperation. Ramalho has proved astute and brave on the chalkboard here, a true pragmatist too, using the most Brazilian of tactics.

This Boca Juniors is new names, old ways

The 5-0 thrashing of Venezuelan Zamora FC in Buenos Aires gave a rash boost of confidence to a Boca Juniors squad which now, being seeded within an affordable group and having won all of their matches so far, aims towards the top post in this Libertadores's last 16. Paradoxically, the new names found in the current roster -Nico Lodeiro and Pablo Daniel Osvaldo protruding amongst them- play the old and ruthless ways that raised Boca to continental glory in the not so far past. 

The quintessential Xeneixe formula is as known as powerful: build reliable partnerships along the different bands no matter whether the tactical shape is a 4-4-2, a 4-2-3-1 or a 4-3-3.

In this vein, the Boca Juniors version that conquered Libertadores in 2007 is remembered for the two basic partnerships built both in the midfield and the attack. Then Boca coach, Miguel Ángel Russo, used to line up a holding duo comprised by protector Pablo Ledesma and creator Éver Banega; likewise, Juan Román Riquelme was positioned -at least nominally- within the same band as target-man Martín Palermo as an industrious Rodrigo Palacio tracked enemy full backs and wingers in the defensive phase. Bianchi's Boca in Libertadores 2003 worked similarly: the midfield partnership was formed by destroyer Sebastián Battaglia and regista Diego Cagna, while the attack featured loads of mobility with Guillermo Barros Schelotto plus Carlos Tévez. Those winning versions of Boca, like many others not as successful, based their ruthlessness over partnerships which enabled the squad to soak up pressure and kill on the counteroffensive.

Boca version 2015, managed by former caudillo Rodolfo Vasco Arruabarrena, isn't that different. Against Zamora, what appeared at first glance as a 4-4-1-1 with Lodeiro and Osvaldo given attacking freedom, was actually a well-drilled 4-3-3 that could circulate the ball towards the flanks in possession (as seen in Boca's third goal from left winger Federico Carrizo).

The new partnerships, however, have certain details of complexity. In the middle, Cristian Erbes acts as the man who protects Boca's defensive line with his positioning and Fernando Gago provides the passing guile on the left. More different is the role of the right midfielder, César Meli, who advances towards the space vacated by Lodeiro's cutting inside in order to feed Osvaldo through crossing. The nature of Boca's midfield determines the attack: the former Southampton and Internazionale forward stays central and the Uruguayan international comes inside to assume the classic number 10 role.

Arruabarrena must feel lucky his side's got some high-profile signings during the winter window which theoretically raise the quality from the same side that lost sorely in semifinals of Copa Sudamericana to archrivals River Plate a couple of months ago.

With the incoming players, Boca now raises greater expectations within a tournament whose format appears tailor-made for this club. Just consider that, with humbler rosters, Boca Juniors reached the final in 2012 and eliminated then reigning champions Corinthians in quarter finals in 2013. That's largely because this club has a blueprint of tactical cruelty and -you may want to call it- dirtiness. As mentioned above, their current group has proved manageable and a fortunate draw will surely place Xeneixes to compete until the very late stages. New names, old ways.