Are Chivas and Club America that different beyond Vergara?

In the midst of the endless scandals, resentful remarks, lies and sackings which permanently surround Chivas more or less since Jorge Vergara got married and divorced, Club America could be pictured as totally different simply by opposition. Two Liga MX titles, one Concacaf Champions League, no relegation troubles and the likes of Diego Reyes, Miguel Layún and Raúl Jiménez departing for good to Europe after completing successful cycles in Coapa. América, the brightest of sunrays; Guadalajara, the darkest of shadows.

The board headed by Ricardo Peláez (who as a striker played for both classic rivals in the nineties), however, has never been exempt of Vergara-esque controversy.  While Miguel Herrera was given up to two short tournaments of tolerance in order to build his summer of 2013 side of champions, the succeeding two America managers - Antonio Mohamed and Gustavo Matosas- were given scarce months to deliver or go away.

Just in the fashion of Florentino Pérez's Real Madrid, Peláez began talks with Matosas a year ago to replace Mohamed while El Turco was on the path for glory. Right after America finished that title's celebrations, Matosas was announced. Managing a team reinforced specifically at request of his predecessor, the Uruguayan struggled in the domestic competition but anyway achieved the berth to the Club World Cup in which the Mexican champions will face Barcelona next December. Matosas had made his own number of requests to Peláez after being painfully eliminated by Pachuca... and the America chairman politely refused them, showing Matosas the exit door.

Then, what's precisely that which differentiates the recent trajectories of Chivas and Club America? Both clubs are no models of public relations, calm, diplomacy and crisis management when things don't come their way, yet both have fared so radically different that a simple look at the relegation table tells the whole story. One could well argue that Chivas' sole reliance on Mexican talent makes them victims of a global trend of which America benefits by playing with seven or eight footballers not born in Mexico ("the team of the Americas", yelled Carlos Reinoso). That might be a legitimate claim, but nonetheless that's one claim played systematically by Jorge Vergara at trying to excuse his own poor work ethics.

Poor work ethics is of course a quintessential lubricant within the system in the Mexican league. No club is exempt, not even America. But perhaps Vergara has raised the standards of poor work ethics to new levels not known in other Liga MX clubs. Somehow, it's telling enough that Major League Soccer had to acquire the Chivas USA franchise after bad results, a shrinking fanbase, and discrimination-related scandals.  

When Vergara took over in 2002, his phrases were heard as flamboyant, audacious, exuberant and politically incorrect -which many believed a good thing to rejuvenate Mexico's top flight-. Now instead, many question Vergara's ability to handle such an important club and there are some who even question his wholesale ability to run the business which allowed him to purchase Chivas in the very first place. Are Chivas and Club America that different beyond Vergara? Not much, but Vergara is certainly an edge enough as to battle for relegation.

Sacking Klinsmann now? the case of Tabárez's Uruguay

 US Soccer always differentiated from the rest of the hemispheric national teams in terms of the durability of its technical staff. Unlike Mexico, Brazil or Argentina, sides which have had half dozens, if not complete ones, of managers throughout the past decade, the USMNT can boast to have had only Arena, Bradley and JK in charge. Path dependence is certainly a good thing from a managerial point of view in football as the staff and its leadership are given time to learn by doing, change, develop and improve.

During the nineties, old-guard world beaters Uruguay were enmeshed into mediocrity, anarchy and absolute failure at trying to qualify to any of that decade's World Cups (if Italy 1990, to which they did qualify, is taken as one from the eighties). Coaches came and went to no avail: La Celeste's exodus far from World Cups lasted 12 years until qualification happened just to endure a group-stage exit in Korea and Japan 2002 to Denmark and Senegal. After that, Uruguay's FA didn't seem to change that much and the unsuccessful path to Germany 2006 was divided between the tenures of Juan Ramón Carrasco and Jorge Fossati.

Following the loss to Australia in penalty kicks in Sidney for the WC continental playoff, Fossati remained but soon he got sacked in favor of Óscar Washington El Maestro Tabárez, whose first challenge in the national job was the 2007 edition of Copa América. There, Uruguay gained momentum and fell short to reaching that tournament's final when Dunga's Brazil beat them... in penalty kicks. As Conmebol's deadly qualifiers loomed for South Africa 2010, Tabárez began introducing young talents like Palermo's Edinson Cavani and Ajax's Luis Suárez. La Celeste finished fifth and sealed its qualification dramatically against a Costa Rican side that just needed one away goal in the continental playoff second leg in Montevideo. Anyway, Tabárez's guys made it to South Africa and the rest is well-known history.

What few see beyond the diehard style and ruthlessness of contemporary Uruguay is that Tabárez actually took the whole shop apart. El Maestro isn't only in charge of the senior squad, but also of the grassroots levels within an integrated and vertical structure of scouting, applied technology and communication with the coaches of the under-age national teams. For all of its old glory, Uruguay was almost nonexistent in junior competitions and following 2007 they can mention more than decent participations in u20 and u17 World Cups: 2007 in Canada, 2011 in Mexico, 2013 in Turkey. The durability of Tabárez's second tenure is certain to generate the path dependence and positive feedback much needed at infusing new generations with the best of the old national identities and styles of play to look forward into future.

The lesson for US Soccer is that no matter what happens in the October 10 showdown against Mexico for the ticket to the 2017 Confederations Cup, Klinsmann must remain in charge. The two successive WC qualifications of Tabárez's Uruguay were possible too with massive doses of good luck: both achieved through continental playoffs, the berth to Brazil 2014 just clinched in the Conmebol's fifth place spot as the host country was already qualified. In the almost ten years since Tabárez took over the national job, Uruguay also suffered an ignominious early exit in the 2012 London Olympics and, at the end of the day, the Uruguayan FA stuck tight with El Maestro.

Sacking Klinsmann and bringing in a new coach perhaps could provoke a rush of blood to the squad that might yield good results on a temporary basis. Those good results, however, are to be expected irrespective of the coach as the only competitive matches coming in the horizon are Concacaf WC qualifiers. Sacking Klinsmann now would equate to having sacked Tabárez after any of the many bad results Uruguay got in its respective paths to the 2010 and 2014 World Cups. If that little country's case has some thing to offer to the enormous US Soccer, that some thing is that path dependence and durability in football are good things.