Boca 0-0 Racing: What will Barros-Schelotto do?

   

   One training session since taking over Boca Juniors was all Guillermo Barros Schelotto had in order to face the Copa Libertadores group stage clash against Racing Club. On the field it clearly appeared so as his side used carbon-copy tactics from last year's Libertadores: a 4-3-3 with Lodeiro tucking in from the right channel and Andrés Chávez staying wide on the left. Carlos Tévez attempted interesting movements around the false nine spot, but Racing stayed compact with two standard banks of four, playing reactive, overall producing a really regrettable football match.

What lessons if any can we take from a goalless draw within an empty stadium? The absence of chanting crowds at least enabled viewers to hear actual tactical instructions (although it was the opposition boss, Facundo Sava, who yelled the most at Rodrigo de Paul to stay permanently ahead of Iván Pillud and keep things cohesive). Barros Schelotto's insistence was on a possession-based style with special attention paid on working out the ball from deep. The midfield trio of Gago-Meli-Pérez caused some problems for rival holding duo of Luciano Aued and Acuña by simply outnumbering them. But it seemed that Racing's simultaneous early double substitution (forced on injuries to Grimmi and Lollo) broke Boca's rythm for the rest of the contest.

In those first brief lapses of acceptable football, the Boca Juniors man who caught the eye was Fernando Gago. As César Meli (he goes by the nickname Cabezón, judging by Orión's yells) and Pablo Pérez shut down the passing lanes of Aued and Acuña (effectively pressing Racing's build-up), Gago had space and time to spray passes sideways judiciously. That's why Sava permanently instructed De Paul to stay ahead of Pillud: because Boca's left full-back Silva motored forward to receive high up the line, thus attempting to stretch the Racing four-man defensive line. De Paul always abided by the instructions, Racing never got that much overstretched and the Boca wide players showed little to none dribbling skills.

What went almost unnoticed, however, was how unsuccessful Racing's high pressing was at preventing Boca from working the ball out of deep positions. Early on Lisandro López and Óscar Romero focused on harrying the Boca centre-backs -Cata Díaz and Chaco Insaurralde- so by the time both Grimmi and Lollo left the field, the Paraguayan playmaker seemed to give up on pressing high and instead went on to cover Gago. In this way, La Academia reverted from a more or less pragmatic 4-4-2 to a very reactive but cohesive 4-4-1-1 that was an absolute success at nullifying the home side.

If Romero gave up his first intentions, much of it can be explained by the quality with the ball of Insaurralde. One of football's greatest truisms is the scarcity of natural, left-footed, centre-backs able to distribute play straight away from the left with speed and accuracy. Which is, that using an inverted right-footed centre-back (as many squads do) risks either losing the ball or losing precious time in the build-up. When regretting his departure, Insaurralde's former boss in Mexican club Jaguares Chiapas, Ricardo La Volpe, remarked that "for him, being left-footed gives a natural technical and tactical advantage. In my opinion he could well be considered material for national team ". In this way much of Boca's most promising passing came from Insaurralde who began to perform the Gago role when Gago himself got taken by Romero.

For such a terrible match, almost a training session itself, the lessons are scarce but clear. Barros Schelotto will implement a possession style based on deep build-up play, high pressure and midfield dominance through outnumbering the rival. His team, however, didn't seem eager to raise the stakes when Racing got compact and this may be a signal of a boss who knows how to play cup competitions. Boca, truth be told, seems an unbalanced squad since some spots are plenty of individual quality while others are simply filled with supporting roles.

River 1-0 Boca: nastiness, gridlock and fight

     There's simply far too much at stake in any River-Boca that those always result in nasty fights, midfield gridlock and packed defenses. These are derbies so actually impassioned on and off the pitch that it doesn't matter whether they are playing friendly summer tournaments in Mendoza or Mar del Plata, the Argentine league for mere three points, or Copa Libertadores's elimination stages: nasty fights, midfield gridlock and packed defenses always prevail.

In truth, in terms of decision-making, the ball was on River's pitch. After their lackluster group stage and their 2-0 defeat to Boca in La Bombonera at the domestic competition days ago, River Plate might have felt that the midfield diamond formation that proved effective at dismantling Boca Juniors to lift Copa Sudamericana last semester was all quite well known to play it again. The diamond used to allow River boss Marcelo Gallardo to attack with five men including the likes of Teo Gutiérrez, Rodrigo Mora, Leo Pisculichi, Carlos Sánchez and Ariel Rojas and produce some spells of beautiful combination football, but it came at expense of being narrow and having the full-backs been told not to motor forward at all.

Therefore, Gallardo reverted to a plain 4-4-2 in which gifted playmaker Pisculichi was dropped to the bench and pure destroyers Leo Ponzio and Matías Kranevitter formed the holding midfield duo. As consequence, River reinforced their flanks and were less vulnerable to quick Boca transitions, but now they were attacking with only four or maybe three individuals (Teo, Mora and Sánchez). The full-backs, as it remains a constant in Gallardo's tenure, were stationed along the centre-backs.

The Boca boss Rodolfo Arruabarrena took somehow more peculiar choices. In his 4-3-3 system, Uruguayan number ten Nicolás Lodeiro is nominally deployed on one of the wings and the other goes for more traditional wingers such as Federico Carrizo and Cristian Pavón. This makes the actual formation to resemble more a 4-4-2 with the traditional winger tracking back and Lodeiro becoming a satellite forward behind a classic target man (surprisingly, Jonathan Calleri won the number nine spot against Pablo Osvaldo). The main shortcoming of a 4-3-3 switching ambiguously into a 4-4-2 is that the midfield components need time to settle in different roles at expense of a clear structure.

Fernando Gago, in this way, endured a tough night misplacing balls under pressure from Ponzio and Kranevitter and could not spray passes sideways either as River's settled 4-4-2 protected the flanks well with Sánchez and Driussi. Lodeiro dropped between the lines but Funes Mori was more than happy coming up to dispossess him with legal (and illegal) tackles. Calleri showed little mobility. It's then fair to say that River Plate thoroughly cancelled all potential Boca threats locking both sides into midfield stalemate.

             

Apart from his preference to always keep full-backs in defensive positions, Gallardo seems faithful to the forward partnership of Teo Gutiérrez and Rodrigo Mora because neither is a classic target man and, having really decent technical skills, both can drop and work the channels well. This provides River with the attacking width lost by their stationed full-backs and poises dillemmas onto Boca's four-man defensive line: should their full-backs motor forward and leave the centre-backs exposed to one-on-one situations with Teo and Mora? or should they be stationed themselves? Both situations happened and it was extraordinary to see Teo Gutiérrez dragging Cata Díaz out of position and winning a great deal of corner kicks for River (which weren't used efficiently as Pisculichi was on the bench). When Arruabarrena realized the danger posed by Teo's mobility, he instructed his full-backs to stay on line and the match got into more gridlock.

One should credit Marcelo Gallardo for making offensive subs taking Ponzio off and bringing in attacker Gonzalo Martínez on the left wing and placing Carlos Sánchez along Kranevitter. Martínez tried to drive past Leandro Marín within the box and the Boca full-back pulled him down for the penalty kick converted by Sánchez. Minutes later, Teo Gutiérrez was sent off and River Plate will sorely miss his best man in the second leg at La Bombonera.

In all, this was a nasty fight gridlocked in the midfield in which River Plate seemed more comfortable than Boca Juniors. Gallardo appear to have more tactical alternatives than Arruabarrena and this looks like River's long awaited vendetta for that cruel elimination to Boca in penalty shootouts in Libertadores 2004.

This Boca Juniors is new names, old ways

The 5-0 thrashing of Venezuelan Zamora FC in Buenos Aires gave a rash boost of confidence to a Boca Juniors squad which now, being seeded within an affordable group and having won all of their matches so far, aims towards the top post in this Libertadores's last 16. Paradoxically, the new names found in the current roster -Nico Lodeiro and Pablo Daniel Osvaldo protruding amongst them- play the old and ruthless ways that raised Boca to continental glory in the not so far past. 

The quintessential Xeneixe formula is as known as powerful: build reliable partnerships along the different bands no matter whether the tactical shape is a 4-4-2, a 4-2-3-1 or a 4-3-3.

In this vein, the Boca Juniors version that conquered Libertadores in 2007 is remembered for the two basic partnerships built both in the midfield and the attack. Then Boca coach, Miguel Ángel Russo, used to line up a holding duo comprised by protector Pablo Ledesma and creator Éver Banega; likewise, Juan Román Riquelme was positioned -at least nominally- within the same band as target-man Martín Palermo as an industrious Rodrigo Palacio tracked enemy full backs and wingers in the defensive phase. Bianchi's Boca in Libertadores 2003 worked similarly: the midfield partnership was formed by destroyer Sebastián Battaglia and regista Diego Cagna, while the attack featured loads of mobility with Guillermo Barros Schelotto plus Carlos Tévez. Those winning versions of Boca, like many others not as successful, based their ruthlessness over partnerships which enabled the squad to soak up pressure and kill on the counteroffensive.

Boca version 2015, managed by former caudillo Rodolfo Vasco Arruabarrena, isn't that different. Against Zamora, what appeared at first glance as a 4-4-1-1 with Lodeiro and Osvaldo given attacking freedom, was actually a well-drilled 4-3-3 that could circulate the ball towards the flanks in possession (as seen in Boca's third goal from left winger Federico Carrizo).

The new partnerships, however, have certain details of complexity. In the middle, Cristian Erbes acts as the man who protects Boca's defensive line with his positioning and Fernando Gago provides the passing guile on the left. More different is the role of the right midfielder, César Meli, who advances towards the space vacated by Lodeiro's cutting inside in order to feed Osvaldo through crossing. The nature of Boca's midfield determines the attack: the former Southampton and Internazionale forward stays central and the Uruguayan international comes inside to assume the classic number 10 role.

Arruabarrena must feel lucky his side's got some high-profile signings during the winter window which theoretically raise the quality from the same side that lost sorely in semifinals of Copa Sudamericana to archrivals River Plate a couple of months ago.

With the incoming players, Boca now raises greater expectations within a tournament whose format appears tailor-made for this club. Just consider that, with humbler rosters, Boca Juniors reached the final in 2012 and eliminated then reigning champions Corinthians in quarter finals in 2013. That's largely because this club has a blueprint of tactical cruelty and -you may want to call it- dirtiness. As mentioned above, their current group has proved manageable and a fortunate draw will surely place Xeneixes to compete until the very late stages. New names, old ways.