Porto’s Lopetegui and Diego Reyes: the art of scapegoating

The argument goes that Mexican defender Diego Reyes was so lacking in confidence and out of position in such a tough scenario that his permanence on the pitch in Allianz Arena dangerously compromised Porto’s interests. Reyes, who, playing as a centre-back, nullified the likes of Leandro Damiao, Oscar and Neymar during the 2012 Olympics final, had just had 477 minutes in seven matches prior to his lineup and, to make things worse, was deployed in the ‘unfamiliar’ right-back spot. By the 33 minutes of the first half, already 3-0 down to Bayern, Julen Lopetegui would have realized his own mistake and subbed Reyes off for natural right-back Ricardo. 

Two more home side goals were to follow in the remaining 12 minutes.

The key to deconstruct such a shallow argument is to analyze events in the first half. For events I mean what Bayern’s attacks were about and not what Reyes did individually (a defender can complete brilliant stats and defend poorly a single set piece that screws up all his previous work). In this respect, this graph about Bayern’s created chances -blue arrows represent passes which lead to shots and yellow arrows represent goal assistances- is very eloquent:

(First half, taken from FourFourTwo's StatsZone)

As seen, the overwhelming bulk of Bayern’s attacks were carried across the heart of Porto’s midfield and Porto’s left side; that is, through the inside play of Thomas Mueller and Robert Lewandowski, and the outside play of Philipp Lahm. Indeed, when still at 0-0, the Pole had hit the goalkeeper’s far post after a quick interior combination with Mueller that showed how easy Bayern could dismantle the away midfield. Remarkably, what the graph also shows is that Porto’s right side just conceded a single created chance (the 1-0 by Thiago Alcántara); the flank covered by Diego Reyes initially and Ricardo subsequently.

The deconstruction of Bayern’s opener illustrates the actual pattern of Porto’s misery. In the one hand, seen from the perspective of a man-marking system, Diego Reyes stuck to Mario Goetze, Bayern’s left winger, and Ricardo Quaresma had to track back Bayern’s left full-back Juan Bernat. In spite that Reyes stuck tight to Goetze when he charged forward inside the box, Bernat was free to cross for Alcántara’s surprise surge. Albeit centre-back Maicon was really poor at Alcántara’s header, he can defend himself by arguing that the Spanish-Brazilian midfielder, again in a man-marking system, was left absolutely uncovered by Héctor Herrera. If, on the other hand, Porto’s system was zonal-marking, then Reyes should have been stationed on Porto’s right flank but then Goetze would be left free to go inside and able to provoke overloads in a far more dangerous zone for Porto. Man-marking or zonal-marking, the Portuguese side was thoroughly outplayed from the birth of Bayern’s attacks.

In other words, Lopetegui’s tactical plan (if one other than sitting very deep did exist) was a total disaster. One should contemplate and hail the Bayern Munich brilliance and Guardiola’s tactical masterclass over a side that almost self-destructed from the show given at Do Dragao. But, if your first reaction as a manager, when you see your side opened up in the midfield and the left side, is to make a straight swap in the right-back spot you are clearly trying to absurdly blame one single component of your system for its wholesale failure.

And that is scapegoating. Diego Reyes now at least knows that Champions League football sometimes implies lumping silently with despotic tyrants.