Is there a Marcelo Bielsa alchemy formula for El Tri?

 Reading the many accounts of Bielsa’s almost scientific methods from British and Spanish journalisms, one gets to think that the Argentine tactician is some sort of alchemist whose formula lifts the same virtues and plunges into the same flaws everywhere he goes. “Bielsa comes in, players first seem to struggle with his revolutionary ideas, then seem to understand them, the squad thus starts playing exhilarating football, fatigue comes and finally all falls into pieces”.

Managing a top-flight club at domestic and international competitions is of course quite different from managing a national team. The former implies daily on-pitch work and the latter implies more observation and paperwork: that’s why Louis van Gaal left the Dutch job to take the reins at Manchester United and that’s why Josep Guardiola seems reluctant to take a national side yet. They both feel energetic enough as to keep going to the training camp, make experiments and deal with pressure day in and day out. Bielsa, theoretically, is the perfect man for a national side and that’s why Mexico wants him.

But such thirst for Bielsa in the Mexican federation obeys the misleading stereotype of Bielsa as a coach with one proven formula that made miracles in Chile, Bilbao and Marseille. Under this light -and excusing the musical metaphor- hiring Bielsa equates to something of buying a Luis Miguel’s album: everyone knows every Luis Miguel album contains exactly the same in terms of great solo voices, love lyrics, ballad rhythms and Frank Sinatra remakes. Luis Miguel’s fans adore them precisely because they know the proven formula, know what to expect and anyway like it. But Bielsa’s tactics and methods are no formula and with him certainly we don’t know what to expect.

In 2007, Bielsa badly needed the Chile job to reinvigorate his career after the ominous passage of the 2002 World Cup with Argentina that couldn’t be entirely vindicated by the 2004 olympic gold medal. Harold Mayne-Nicholl’s Chilean Federation needed Bielsa and Bielsa needed Harold Mayne-Nicholl’s Chilean Federation. Bielsa then could work over the basis of Claudio Borghi’s Colo-Colo with youngsters such as Alexis Sánchez, Arturo Vidal, Claudio Bravo, Jorge Valdivia and Humberto Suazo. In the Basque country during the summer of 2011, Bielsa was part of Josu Urrutia’s presidential bid to Athletic de Bilbao and the first season the man from Rosario created the most courageous mid-table club across Europe beating United at Old Trafford and staging an epic match against Guardiola’s finest Barcelona in the old San Mamés. Unable to retain or line-up Athletic’s best players -Javi Martínez and Fernando Llorente- his squad began to fade into mediocrity. Seemingly, Olympique de Marseille was lured by the stereotype of the alchemist’s formula without signing Bielsa’s required footballers and without retaining the flagships of that first season: Payet, Ayew, Gignac and Imbula. Today Marseille is headless in the technical direction. Needless to say, the three teams played completely different tactics and strands of football through very different paths.

The Mexican federation, an organization well renowned by the shallowness and improvisation of its decision-making, seems, like Marseille, yet another board lured by the stereotype of the alchemist’s formula. Former Mexico boss Javier Aguirre declared that Bielsa called him to get to know the Japanese federation after being offered Aguirre’s former post in Tokyo. It’s also true that Saudi Arabia looked for Bielsa this summer and finally got World Cup runner-up Alejandro Sabella instead. For all of his ‘craziness’, Bielsa seems the first to be acquainted of the effect his stereotype exerts over headless boards. For El Tri fans now led into the Bielsa saga, unlike Luis Miguel fans, all is very uncertain and nobody actually knows what to expect.

River Plate 3-0 Tigres: to pounce and subdue

With a less expensive squad, fraught with injuries, suspensions and high-profile summer departures, River Plate took Tigres to a war of attrition -the previous three matches between them had ended all leveled- and finally broke the stalemate to prompt their rivals' collapse and collect their third Copa Libertadores. They did so basically by persisting in fielding two classic number nines, capitalizing the only one-on-one situation with the Tigres backline, and being clinical at set-pieces just as they were against Atlético Nacional in Copa Sudamericana six months ago.

For large spells of the first half -and considering the heavy rain- both teams didn't retain meaningful possession and the game became finals-like and dull: River couldn't because Ponzio and Kranevitter aren't gifted passers and Tigres weren't willing to because preferred counterattacking. In such a scenario the quick transition game of the Mexican side proved once again to be delivering when Funes Mori got attracted to Rafael Sobis and deflected poorly just for the Brazilian forward to make an equally poor reception and waste a clear chance. A few moments later, the Tigres right winger Jürgen Damm wreaked havoc in River's left flank only for André-Pierre Gignac to waste yet another chance for the visitors. For those very spells River Plate and Tigres became good reflections of their respective leagues: Liga Mx with play quicker and more incisive; Argentine First Division, more physical and strategic.

River netted the opener with an unexpected combination that goes against the locals' traditional flux of play: left full-back Leonel Vangioni took on Damm and crossed for Lucas Alario to head home between the Tigres center-back duo. As the above graphic shows, both Marcelo Gallardo and Ricardo Ferretti lined-up similar formations that appeared to cancel each other out as every field player had a direct cover reference. When Vangioni got past Damm, he suddenly enjoyed good time and space, but that successful challenge doesn't explain in itself why the Tigres four-man defensive line appeared so static. That has to do with Gallardo's persistence on fielding two classic number nines.

After Alario's goal, Mexican media claimed that the Argentine striker should have been sent off for two reckless tackles on Mexican full-back Jorge Torres Nilo and on goalkeeper Nahuel Guzmán. Alario's nasty maneuvers, however, were done over each one of Tigres' flanks: on the right corner first and on the left corner later, hence illustrating Alario's mobility and coordination with his attacking partner Fernando Cavenaghi. For River's first goal, the latter pulled wide to attract Juninho's cover and to open space for the former's header in a one-on-one situation against José Rivas. Credit should be given to Marcelo Gallardo who persisted in his system despite the fact of having neither Teo Gutiérrez nor Rodrigo Mora. 

The second goal was simply a sloppy tackle from Javier Aquino to his cover reference Carlos Sánchez, and the Uruguayan himself converted the resulting penalty kick. The third goal was pure Gallardo's River insofar as El Muñeco introduced Leonardo Pisculichi -whose left foot is well renowned after assisting for the goals of the Copa Sudamericana final- to curl in a corner kick for Ramiro Funes Mori to head home. It's truly noteworthy how River's goals against Atlético Nacional resemble the last one against Tigres and it makes one wonder whether Gallardo would have relied only on Pisculichi's magnificent set-pieces to maintain his side cohesive had the match gone towards extra time.

    

The attrition war proposed by River worked out as the Argentines brought the Mexicans onto a field of physicality and strategy. Tigres, nevertheless, did enjoy good chances when they managed to exploit their pace at counterattacks: incisiveness and clinical finishing is what they missed. River had both of them and thus we can fairly say that they pounced and subdued their expensive rivals to get continental silverware.

The MLS is what Giovani Dos Santos makes of it

  Barring the Miguel Herrera scandal, the biggest concern for Mexican media in Giovani Dos Santos's first presser as Galaxy player was the likelihood of a slump in form as consequence of landing in the MLS. Having plied his trade for a decent Spanish club the last two seasons, the argument goes, Gio's play would now dip and jeopardize his hitherto regular call-ups for El Tri. "I just don't see how playing here would affect my international caps", said the eldest of the Dos Santos brothers.

Indeed, much of the MLS-equal-to-a-step-behind-for-Giovani reasoning is rooted within what might be called football's realpolitik: the politics of reality in football. Are Sevilla, Valencia or Villarreal better squads than Galaxy? Yes, therefore: the MLS represents one step behind for the Mexican forward. Is Real Madrid better than Stoke City or West Ham? Yes, therefore: Chicharito must be loaned without further discussion to Madrid (no matter how scarce the odds are for regular play). Football's realpolitik framed the debate in Mexico between supporters and skeptics of Chicharito's move last season and, in perspective, we can conclude that going into a big club in a big league is no straight synonym of big news and great things for every player.

Instead, clubs and leagues are what players make of them. As little as a year ago, many of the MLS's new high-profile signings well into their thirties were regulars at Champions League or Premier League clubs. Those players were able to extend their careers for years amongst the finest of the European game first and foremost because they're great professionals who placed their talents over the basis of constancy, consistency and hard work. After all, a move to MLS should be analyzed through case-by-case optics.

"Yes, Pirlo and company are great professionals who -like Robbie Keane already does- will surely put up their best for their new clubs, but nonetheless they're old players who, implicitly if not explicitly, are done with international football, unlike younger Gio Dos Santos", a good rebuttal may be. In such a case, Giovani's MLS career would be better compared to those of American players who, like Giovani, plied their trade at decent European clubs with mixed fortunes before being lured by lucrative contracts and starting spots. Clint Dempsey was a Premier League regular for Fulham and achieved glorious things while in London like his goal against Juventus in 2010 and the one against United at Old Trafford for Tottenham; Michael Bradley was a regular too for Borussia Monchengladbach in the Bundesliga and later Rudi García gave him good minutes when in Rome; Jozy Altidore, on the other hand, netted constantly in the Eredivisie but his stay in Sunderland was a failure. Case-by-case optics.

Mexican media and punditry will do well if for once they avoid using football's realpolitik at assessing a move between clubs and leagues. Much bland speaking was used a year ago from those cheering the Javier Hernández loan to Real Madrid to lambast and mock those skeptical about it. In any case, the MLS career of Gio Dos Santos will in all likelihood resemble the European career of Gio Dos Santos: moments of flare and sublime inspiration, and long spells of inconsistency and injury. The MLS will be what Gio makes of it.

Tigres 0-0 River: Gallardo may retreat back (even more)

Key to River Plate's successful continental stride so far under Marcelo Gallardo have been the full-backs Leonel Vangioni and Gabriel Mercado. When Gallardo deployed a diamond in midfield with traditional playmaker Pisculichi and the squad became thus too narrow, both defenders thoroughly maintained their positions and formed a defensive line of four centre-backs that gave much solidity behind. That's why River gets ultra-competitive in finals and that's why they got a draw in Monterrey against Tigres that leaves all to be decided in Buenos Aires next week.

Gallardo, a traditional number ten himself as a player, got rid of his trademark diamond in favor of a more pragmatic 4-4-2 with no playmaker ahead of this Libertadores's first leg against Boca Juniors. The wingers, Uruguayans Carlos Sánchez and Tabaré Viudez, work their flanks so Mercado and Vangioni are scarcely exposed to the rival's full-backs and Matías Kranevitter brilliantly guards the front of his defense while Leo Ponzio harries whoever gets the ball. In front, Teo Gutiérrez used to drop and work the channels to provide the width lost by the cautiousness of Mercado and Vangioni. Recently signed forward Lucas Alario is completely different: the strategy with Rodrigo Mora against Tigres yesterday focused in making life difficult to Guido Pizarro, Tigres' holding midfielder.

As a result of harassing Pizarro and pushing him deep between the Tigres centre-backs, the Liga Mx side's game-building became a bit nervous and prone to making mistakes under pressure. Soon before Hugo Ayala was subbed off due to injury in the first half, he and Juninho got entangled with the ball, Nahuel Guzmán forced to sweep behind them, and Ayala knocked over by his own goalkeeper. In some ways Gallardo was astute enough to identify the key players in Tigres' tactical backbone (Pizarro, Rafael Sobis and André-Pierre Gignac) and isolate them with double covers. Maidana and Funes-Mori, River's central defenders, more often than not alienated and annoyed the Frenchman with harsh maneuvers; and Kranevitter negated Sobis any pocket of space between the lines with his positional awareness throwing him into Ponzio's custody. It's not strange then that Tigres boss Ricardo Ferretti instructed Sobis to exchange positions with Damián Álvarez in the left wing to form a 4-3-3 during the last minutes of the match when the locals got the best of a now shaky River Plate backline.

Despite the fact that Gallardo tells Vangioni and Mercado to keep position and be cohesive, River Plate get distressed when their opposition launches wingers and full-backs to attack high up the pitch. When faced with Edgardo Bauza's San Lorenzo at Recopa Sudamericana, full-backs Emmanuel Mas and Julio Buffarini showed that River bleeds at the outside. The best chances of Tigres came when right winger Jürgen Damm took on Vangioni: the first half promising cross that Sobis should have headered home, and the second half poor Vangioni tackle that left Damm alone in front of River's goalkeeper Marcelo Barovero. The flanks, the flanks, the flanks, appears to be the mantra for Ricardo Ferretti at Monumental de Núñez.

Gallardo may resort to promising young defender Emanuel Mammana to cover the absence of Mercado due to a second yellow card, but otherwise his side will be as expected from the Monterrey leg. Individually, Tigres seem a superior squad and pretty much well trained, but the Argentines should appeal at their crowds and Gallardo surely may retreat back (even more) to set his squad on 'finals mode'.

The end of Miguel Herrera as that of Jay Gatsby

The last chapters of Fitzgerald's The Great Gatsby depict the toil of Nick Carraway at attempting to give Gatsby's body a decent funeral. No one, from the streams of visitors that had flooded Gatsby's mansion during his many parties, cared to show up and say a last goodbye to the otherwise mysterious playboy. 'They were careless people', mourned Carraway at such a desolation.

The tragedy of Miguel Herrera at El Tri can well be compared to that of Mr. Gatsby if one takes into account that both characters share personal histories of truly humble past whose rising star eventually -and temporarily- made them famed, rich and beloved by everyone. The tale of the self-made men. Coming from a poor town in Hidalgo, Herrera made a football career as a diehard defender for Mexican clubs typically identified with the working classes like Atlante and Toros Neza. Fitzgerald is said to have based Gatsby on the story of Greek slave Trimalchio, who legally obtains liberty and through hard work amasses incredible wealth that subsequently squanders giving lavish banquets to impress his guests.

"¡Hay tiro! ¡Hay tiro!" shouted a cheerful Paul Aguilar using a country parlance which equates to something like "Let's get ready to rumble!" when his now former boss approached pundit Christian Martinoli at the immigration and customs spot somewhere between Philadelphia and Monterrey. Aguilar, known for his exuberant goal celebrations and his tendency to collapse when a rival whispers at his ear, would have shown Herrera his support in such a way according to Martinoli's coworker and former Mexico player Luis García. He went further on Guillermo Ochoa: 'You seem to me an average goalie, but even more average as a person with that mocking laugh during the whole flight back'.  

García's words regrettably reveal what we all began to know when the Dos Santos brothers pandered to Herrera's misbehavior via Twitter. Many of the players, perhaps those most questioned, formed an entourage of much self-indulgence and scarce self-criticism in the world of El Piojo. Not all were like that, but the images of a paralyzed and speechless Carlos Vela before a furious Herrera approaching Martinoli to give more verbal abuse in the boarding queue, and the apathetic remarks of Héctor Herrera ("I wasn't in charge of him"), also reveal how lonely Herrera was within a group of thirty or more individuals. El Tri has no leadership on moral grounds.

Soon after Herrera's sacking was made official, Javier Estepa, an Spanish journalist from Marca, tweeted that with the gone boss many of his former footballers may refrain from the national team too in retaliation. As much as anything happens in Mexican football lately, it is nonetheless true that national bosses have come and gone without any player voluntarily withdrawing from international duties out of a sense of solidarity. 'Professionalism', is how Andrés Guardado named it after the Panamá match.

Perhaps El Tri has become a protracted saga of lavish banquets like those offered by Trimalchio. Perhaps a good bunch of the Mexican players are like those visitors flooding Gatsby's Mansion within Fitzgerald's novel. The fact that Herrera now will fall into an oblivion after his great time of richness and fame tells so much as Gatsby's lonely funeral: it says much more about those absent than it says about the corpse.

La Palomita y la Copa Incómoda

Tras un vínculo iniciado hace cuatro años en la Copa América de Argentina, la Copa América que Chile organiza es el último torneo en que la Roja vestirá el logo de la marca alemana Puma en sus indumentarias oficiales. Nike será el nuevo proveedor de la Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Profesional de Chile (ANFP) al derrotar a Puma ofreciendo, extraoficialmente, siete millones de dólares anuales hasta 2023 y superando de lejos los tres millones anuales pagados por los alemanes en el contrato anterior.   

El anuncio de camisetas Nike para un seleccionado que vio el desplome de su 'caché' mercadotécnico en los doce años que duró  su ausencia de participaciones mundialistas entre 1998 y 2010 luce como la reivindicación comercial de su resurrección futbolística. Chile, a final de cuentas, se convierte en el único combinado nacional de la Conmebol que viste la palomita estadounidense aparte del Brasil pentacampeón.

Sin embargo, lejos está de ser reivindicación ya que dicha corporación estaría metida hasta el tuétano en las acusaciones de corrupción que el Gobierno de Estados Unidos emprendió contra la burocracia de la FIFA; incluida Conmebol y socios comerciales. Según un artículo del Wall Street Journal firmado por Sara Germano y Patricia Kowsmann, ejecutivos de Nike habrían realizado desembolsos 'paralelos' a miembros de la Confederación Brasileña de Fútbol (CBF) del contrato de 200 millones de dólares de 1996 que vio el inicio del matrimonio entre Nike y el Scratch.

Después del éxito comercial del mundial de Estados Unidos '94, Nike Inc. se convenció de apostar fuerte por el fútbol asociación para recibir una rebanada grande del pastel que Adidas solía comerse casi sola. Y así fue que rompieron lanzas por el entonces tetracampeón. Pero los estadounidenses poco sabían de hacer tratos con dirigentes sudamericanos, como Philip Knight, cofundador de Nike, reveló en declaraciones de 1997: "Nos quedamos un poco sorprendidos en términos de la política del fútbol y en el cómo se hacen negocios en ese mundo... De algún modo es el más político de todos los deportes".  Para 2001, una investigación del Congreso en Brasilia descubrió que el contrato de 1996 estipulaba el pago directo, sin intermediarios, entre Nike y la CBF. Acusaciones hechas públicas en las últimas semanas arrojan que 30 ó 40 millones de esos 200 fueron dados a un intermediario (José Hawilla, CEO de la compañía Traffic) para pagar sobornos, hacer favores y entregar dádivas (a Ricardo Texeira, ex directivo de la CBF, de paradero desconocido y quien sólo aparece en el reporte como "Co-conspirador #11").

Los cargos del Departamento de Justicia no mencionan a Nike como tal, sino como "Compañía de Indumentaria Deportiva A".  Y aunque ningún ejecutivo carga de momento sobre sí acusación alguna, e incluso se habla de cooperación con las autoridades, la Real Federación Holandesa de Fútbol (KNVB) sujetó a revisión su propio contrato con Nike que, también, data de 1996.

Sin dudas la de Chile será la Copa incómoda para Nike. En un plano de análisis superficial, no sólo el seleccionado anfitrión y Brasil aparecerán en el roster de la corporación, sino que también el balón oficial del torneo, el 'Cachaña' (regate, en quechua), es proporcionado por Nike: la Conmebol, de la cual los ex dirigentes Nicolás Leoz y Eugenio Figueredo llevan sobre sus cabezas pedidos de extradición, acordó desde la Copa América del 2004 el patrocinio de la pelota oficial tras no renovar su acuerdo con Penalty, una compañía brasileña que también proveía los balones de la Copa Libertadores. Just do it.

En un plano de análisis más profundo, la implicación de Nike en el fútbol sudamericano invita a reflexionar sobre el rol de las corporaciones multinacionales en el mundo en vías de desarrollo, o más bien, en la globalización. Hace dos décadas, la publicación de Empire de Michael Hardt y Antonio Negri tuvo tal éxito que dicho rol sólo podía explicarse en términos económicos: el post-fordismo, la división geográfica de los procesos de producción, hizo de las corporaciones entes supranacionales, multinacionales, con capacidad de dirigir la distribución (extracción, según los autores) del capital. Por ello, común era observar entre los movimientos globalifóbicos pancartas contra las fábricas de Nike en Bangladesh o Pakistán citando las infrahumanas condiciones de trabajo infantil en la confección de uniformes y balones.

Pero el asunto entre Nike y la CBF sugiere algo distinto. Económico sí, pero esencialmente político, como dijo Knight en 1997. En este caso estamos frente a un asunto de cultura política en que igual participan ejecutivos norteamericanos que burócratas brasileños, chilenos, o federativos holandeses. Un asunto así invita a pensar que el fútbol se ha transformado en un escenario tan global que borra las divisiones entre el mundo desarrollado y el mundo en vías de desarrollo, como sugería Empire, y que más bien estamos ante fenómenos novedosos que ya ameritan nuevas aproximaciones. La palomita es más que economía.

Artículos en español (2015)

La decadencia de la FIFA vista desde Fukuyama (Nexos)

Caso Melitón ¿Por qué casi no hay porteros mexicanos en Europa? (Fútbol de Café)

La Fenice Juventina o algo pasó en Italia (el9ymedio)

La Revolución Jémez-Sarri (el9ymedio)

Thierry Henry en México (Fútbol de Café)

Jeremy Menez, Hernanes o el futbolista-vine (el9ymedio)

Leiton Jiménez a la Selección Mexicana (Fútbol de Café)

Carlitos en modo bestia (el9ymedio)

Marsella-Lyon: buen reflejo de la Ligue 1, buen resultado para la Ligue 1 (el9ymedio)

La contradicción de Pep (el9ymedio)