The amazing proliferation of playmakers in MLS

The one and only feature that shocked most during the first-leg clash between Seattle Sounders and FC Dallas was the presence of a clear-cut pattern in almost every goal threat. Whether it was Mauro Diaz spraying accurate through balls towards the channels worked by the Colombian speedy pair of Michael Barrios and Fabián Castillo -even unlocking Seattle's defense towards David Texeira-, or Andreas Ivanschitz getting past Cirigliano for the home side's eventual equalizer, the evidence is conclusive: traditional number tens surprisingly thrive in Major League Soccer.

Long thought as an obsolete interpretation of the position -mostly in Europe-, the old-school playmaker, enganche or trequartista, as it's called in Argentina and Italy, for all of his technical virtue, guile and flair, demands constant movement and pace by his forwards, shuttlers and full-backs. This player became endangered in the European game since it usually implies the deployment of two strikers that, by themselves, should provide the attacking width: which is fine in offensive phases, but becomes problematic at defending against wide formations such as, say, standard 4-4-2. Thus, classic tens like Francesco Totti or Luka Modric found place either as "false nines" (that is, an strikerless formation for possession-oriented sides), or as holding midfielders (deeper, they face less pressure, the argument goes).

Part of the above point also applies to our case-study playmakers: Diaz and Ivanschitz. In the first case, the Argentine occupied the number ten role in a modern 4-2-3-1 that has become default formation everywhere insofar as the wingers - for this specific, Barrios and Castillo- are willing and disciplined to track back and form two banks of four that make life impossible for the opposition. The downside of this approach is that it puts a considerable work load on the wingers' legs, exhausts them and risks losing cohesion (which actually happened when Sounders staged the 2-1 comeback). During the first stages of the match, however, Mauro Diaz and the Colombians were stealing the show and FC Dallas should have taken a bigger lead. Ivanschitz, on the other hand, was placed by Sigi Schmid on the left wing in an otherwise crystal-clear 4-4-2. There, the Austrian charged towards the center making overloads and helping Seattle to retain possession (Dempsey and Martins provided width).

Ivanschitz's equalizer is most illustrative the way playmakers operate in MLS. The Austrian overloaded the midfield (three men from Sounders, holding midfielders plus Ivanschitz against Ulloa and Cirigliano from FC Dallas), received the ball, beat Cirigliano and -astonishingly- found oceans of empty space in the spot that should have been covered by Jamaica full-back JV Watson. Ivanschitz pulled the trigger and netted home past Jesse González. What Ivanschitz did with his interior movement, tactically speaking, is a gamble: invites his full-back to make overlapping runs but entices Watson to do the same and leave a massive void in FC Dallas' defense. Sometimes it works, sometimes it backfires.

                                                

The underlying reason for the proliferation of old-fashioned playmakers is that MLS full-backs more often than not get caught too up in the pitch. Reading a piece on Borussia Dortmund's new boss Thomas Tuchel (who had Ivanschitz at Mainz in Bundesliga), one discovers that his predilection for playmakers (now he uses Shinji Kagawa) actually lies in the German trend of pressing relentlessly the opposition build-up play: the number ten harries the holding midfielder to force him to lose possession and produce an instant goal opportunity. An alternative to counter this kind of pressing is using a three-men defensive line that transforms full-backs into wing-backs and covers for their overlapping runs. It's fair to say that it's matter of time to the number ten's proliferation in MLS to provoke tactical developments similar to other leagues everywhere else.

Until we reach that point, nonetheless, virtuous playmakers like Michael Bradley or Nacho Piatti too will remain a huge attractive for a league that, for now, resembles something of a lost paradise.

MLS's underperformance in CCL shows lack of middle class

   With a starting eleven plenty of the young and inexperienced, Seattle Sounders' loss to Olimpia in Honduras shows that clubs from MLS still lack an adequate middle class to serve as cushion between the high-profile signings and the youth ranks. That middle class turns to be most compulsory if the MLS really wants to get out of its domestic bubble and poise a real threat to the Liga Mx hegemony in Concacaf.

"A Real Madrid (consisting) of Zidanes and Pavones", was the old saying during Florentino Pérez's first administration a decade ago in precise reference to that absent middle class within Madrid's squad that could come to solve the many problems of playing La Liga and Champions League simultaneously. Real Madrid lacked that: either they had the stellar likes of Zidane, Figo, Ronaldo and Beckham, or the mundane likes of Albert Celades, Francisco Pavón, Raúl Bravo or Javier Portillo. With no middle class of highly competitive and somewhat lower-profile footballers, Madrid got prematurely eliminated in several Champions League editions to clubs with such names as Marcelo Zalayeta, Juninho Pernambucano, Alberto Aquilani and Alexander Hleb.

At this stage the MLS resembles the first Real Madrid of Florentino Pérez a lot. Galaxy provides a good example: either they have the Dos Santos and the Gerrards, or the Zardes and the Villarreals. The Homegrown Player Rule -which allows MLS clubs to offer better contracts than otherwise to two designated grassroots players- indeed fosters the development of more mature and experienced members of the squad; just two HGP berths are, however, indeed too few as to build an ample and robust middle class. The case of the Panamá goalkeeper Jaime Penedo illustrates what may be considered poor management by Galaxy's decision-makers: competitive, a keeper for all seasons, way cheaper in terms of salary, and nonetheless permitted to leave for good. What are the prospects for Galaxy in this CCL with no middle class?

Traditionally, the middle class isn't developed patiently, but rather bought and brought from somewhere else. At the closing of MLS's last transfer window about a month ago, Argentina retained its top spot as the biggest purveyor of foreign talent with 26 players surpassing the 22 coming from the UK. Barring such names as Red Bulls' Gonzalo Verón and Portland Timbers' Lucas Melano, the lion's share of that Argentine bulk doesn't occupy designated places which means that they could be part of a MLS early middle class. Moreover, some Argentines who are designated players are so just nominally as they earn much, much less than others. They are Nacho Piatti ($400,000), Cristian Maidana ($217,250) or Matías Laba ($325,000), to name a few.

Middle-class players aren't patiently looked after to grow up because their function is rather to make room for the development of the promising minors: they are the already mature and experienced that can go to Honduras and play Olimpia along some youngsters and teach them the professionals' tricks in actual competitive conditions. Neither Francisco Pavón nor Javier Portillo developed properly at Real Madrid as -when playing- were charged with the massive responsibilities of wearing the Madrid badge. At the end, the policy of "Zidanes and Pavones" proved a total failure and the Spanish giant had to wait until Florentino Pérez's second tenure to lift a new Champions League trophy.

In the case of MLS, that same policy doesn't work when outside the MLS. Be it in Honduras, Costa Rica or Mexico, Concacaf now demands deeper and more experienced squads. Without that middle class, which is just beginning to form as Argentina keeps feeding the league, the MLS will certainly still struggle in the CCL.

The MLS is what Giovani Dos Santos makes of it

  Barring the Miguel Herrera scandal, the biggest concern for Mexican media in Giovani Dos Santos's first presser as Galaxy player was the likelihood of a slump in form as consequence of landing in the MLS. Having plied his trade for a decent Spanish club the last two seasons, the argument goes, Gio's play would now dip and jeopardize his hitherto regular call-ups for El Tri. "I just don't see how playing here would affect my international caps", said the eldest of the Dos Santos brothers.

Indeed, much of the MLS-equal-to-a-step-behind-for-Giovani reasoning is rooted within what might be called football's realpolitik: the politics of reality in football. Are Sevilla, Valencia or Villarreal better squads than Galaxy? Yes, therefore: the MLS represents one step behind for the Mexican forward. Is Real Madrid better than Stoke City or West Ham? Yes, therefore: Chicharito must be loaned without further discussion to Madrid (no matter how scarce the odds are for regular play). Football's realpolitik framed the debate in Mexico between supporters and skeptics of Chicharito's move last season and, in perspective, we can conclude that going into a big club in a big league is no straight synonym of big news and great things for every player.

Instead, clubs and leagues are what players make of them. As little as a year ago, many of the MLS's new high-profile signings well into their thirties were regulars at Champions League or Premier League clubs. Those players were able to extend their careers for years amongst the finest of the European game first and foremost because they're great professionals who placed their talents over the basis of constancy, consistency and hard work. After all, a move to MLS should be analyzed through case-by-case optics.

"Yes, Pirlo and company are great professionals who -like Robbie Keane already does- will surely put up their best for their new clubs, but nonetheless they're old players who, implicitly if not explicitly, are done with international football, unlike younger Gio Dos Santos", a good rebuttal may be. In such a case, Giovani's MLS career would be better compared to those of American players who, like Giovani, plied their trade at decent European clubs with mixed fortunes before being lured by lucrative contracts and starting spots. Clint Dempsey was a Premier League regular for Fulham and achieved glorious things while in London like his goal against Juventus in 2010 and the one against United at Old Trafford for Tottenham; Michael Bradley was a regular too for Borussia Monchengladbach in the Bundesliga and later Rudi García gave him good minutes when in Rome; Jozy Altidore, on the other hand, netted constantly in the Eredivisie but his stay in Sunderland was a failure. Case-by-case optics.

Mexican media and punditry will do well if for once they avoid using football's realpolitik at assessing a move between clubs and leagues. Much bland speaking was used a year ago from those cheering the Javier Hernández loan to Real Madrid to lambast and mock those skeptical about it. In any case, the MLS career of Gio Dos Santos will in all likelihood resemble the European career of Gio Dos Santos: moments of flare and sublime inspiration, and long spells of inconsistency and injury. The MLS will be what Gio makes of it.

Respuesta a Martín del Palacio: 'La Liga Mx contra las demás'

  Hace más o menos siete años, cuando realicé el cambio hacia internet como medio de información básico para enterarme de fútbol, di con la columnas de Martín del Palacio en Mediotiempo.com. En resumen se trata de un gran periodista cuya labor me ha ayudado a ser un aficionado menos susceptible a quedar a merced de los juicios de la televisión en México. Y eso, hoy más que nunca, es de agradecerse.

Dicho eso, no puedo estar más en desacuerdo con su última columna, ‘La Liga Mx contra las demás’. En ella, del Palacio concluye que la Liga Mx no es la catástrofe que muchos queremos ver y que, más bien, debería vérsela como ‘nuestro jardín que, aunque descuidado y con bastantes hierbas malas, sigue dando buenos frutos.’ Unos párrafos más arriba él compara los escándalos de la Liga Mx con los problemas salariales que hay en España, las bancarrotas en la Premier, y el amaño de partidos en la Bundesliga. Y, como argumento final, utiliza un párrafo para decir que, en vista del nivel deportivo e infraestructura de clubes mexicanos y estadounidenses, ‘la MLS está bastante peor que la nuestra.’

Yo sí creo que la Liga Mx es una catástrofe cuyos graves vicios difícilmente se ven en las otras buenas ligas del mundo (incluida la MLS). Y la madre de todos esos vicios (multipropiedad, adeudos salariales, compra-venta de franquicias, pausas para hidratarse en partidos jugados a las 8 de la noche, gobiernos estatales y presidencias municipales usando dinero público en fútbol) es la falta de cultura del estado de derecho entre los dueños del fútbol mexicano.

El problema no es de formas (torneos cortos o torneos largos, con liguilla o sin liguilla, propietario único o multipropiedad, con promotores o sin promotores, empresa dueña o gobierno dueño o sociedad civil dueña, etcétera), el problema es de fondo: eso que yo llamo falta de cultura del estado de derecho, en otras palabras, es que el fútbol mexicano alguna vez se rija por reglas (las que los dueños manden y dispongan) y que los propios dueños se abstengan de violar y cambiar a discreción las reglas que ellos mismos establecieron.

¿A qué me refiero? Comparemos MLS y Liga Mx. En Estados Unidos la liga como ente participa de la gestión económica y deportiva de todos y cada uno de los clubes de la MLS: desde la más añeja franquicia de Red Bulls de Nueva York (con todo y su flamante estadio nuevo) hasta la más reciente de los Timbers de Portland. Entonces, viéndola superficialmente, podría argumentarse que la MLS es la tierra de la multipropiedad en su máxima expresión -hay una liga ‘todopoderosa’ que crea y controla los destinos de los clubes- y que en México el mal es por lo tanto significativamente menor.

Pero no es así porque la MLS está encargada de salvaguardar y equilibrar los intereses deportivos y económicos de sus clubes. Veamos el caso de la ‘expropiación’ de Chivas USA. Tras aguantar un vendaval de acusaciones de racismo contra Chivas USA por parte de la prensa estadounidense, la MLS decidió comprarle la franquicia a Jorge Vergara después de diez años de estadios vacíos, decepciones deportivas y usar al club de Los Ángeles como cementerio de elefantes (‘Bofo’, ‘Cubo’, ‘Chore’, etcétera) de Chivas de Guadalajara.  Fueron los aspectos deportivos y económicos -y no el presunto racismo que apareció en la prensa- los que forzaron a la MLS a ‘expropiarle’ la franquicia a Vergara.

La MLS hoy está buscando dueños para Chivas USA bajo tres condiciones: uno, que el equipo permanezca en Los Ángeles; dos, que se construya un nuevo estadio; y tres, que el candidato no posea ya otra franquicia de MLS (descartando así a Stan Kroenke, máximo inversor del Colorado Rapids).  La MLS, en resumen, está buscando evitar a toda costa los vicios del modelo mexicano.

¿Qué hubiera pasado si la Liga Mx hubiera puesto esas tres condiciones a, digamos, la compra del Atlas de hace algunos meses?

Desde luego la Liga Mx jamás actuará con semejante apego a estado de derecho porque los dueños carecen de ello en absoluto. Un día los federativos salen a decir que no habrá más multipropiedad (porque los dueños mismos lo acordaron reunidos) y al otro día Grupo Pachuca y Tv Azteca consolidan su propiedad sobre cuatro clubes de primera división en una liga de 18.

Y esto desde luego tiene graves consecuencias deportivas. ¿Cómo es que la selección de una liga tan pobre y tan paupérrima como la MLS lleva 20 años consecutivos clasificándose al mundial en primer lugar de una zona tan pobre y tan paupérrima como la Concacaf?

Que no se malentienda, escribiendo esto no estoy buscando traicionar a la patria ni vendérsela a los gringos. Yo sí veo en la Liga Mx una liga que en el mejor de los casos está condenada a vivir en la cerrazón y en el peor en la catástrofe.  El nuestro no es un jardín que, aunque descuidado y con bastantes hierbas malas, sigue dando buenos frutos; sino más bien uno cuyas malas hierbas se propagan a discreción en el abono de la falta absoluta de cultura del estado de derecho. Así al menos lo veo yo.