What's behind Klinsmann's Mexican quest?

The current fuss in México's footballing environment raised by the call-ups to the US national team for Ventura Alvarado and William Yarbrough may make us neglect the serious troubles that Jurgen Klinsmann now has. Such are the limitations within US Soccer grassroots levels that the California-based German boss pursues a selection agenda based on foreign scouting and -you may wanna call it- free riding.

As tough as 'free riding' sounds, I believe the concept fits this situation. A good illustration of it is the fuss raised back in 2008 when Ivan Rakitic, amongst many other Swiss-born Croatian players, switched allegiance from Switzerland to Croatia. During that year's European Championships, co-organized by the former country, it wasn't uncommon to hear angry Swiss fans supporting every rival that the latter country had within the tournament. "The thing is that players like him (Rakitic) and Mladen Petric (former Dortmund and Hamburg striker) have benefited from our youth ranks system and also from playing in our clubs so they could jump to big Bundesliga sides and now, quite talented as they are, they turn their backs on us by playing for Croatia ", went the Swiss rant.

The scheme is the following: within a world of ever-increasing migration trends, a national federation whose domestic youth ranks system is unable to feed its national side with an adequate pool of eligible players must look for talent abroad by means of constant scouting. Of course, a constant foreign scouting program sometimes implies tug-of-wars with foreign federations, foreign clubs, foreign media and foreign egos.

When Mexico coach Miguel Herrera went unapologetic by remarking that the Club León goalkeeper Yarbrough was only one amongst other eight or nine Mexican goalies, he was in fact reflecting the big egocentrism that pervades Mexican football when it comes to players being lured by US Soccer: that's reminiscent of the cases of Francisco Torres and Edgar Castillo. When these players end up finding little to none playing time with the United States at major tournaments such as World Cups, Mexican pundits regard this as confirmation of an alleged lack of talent that wasn't worthy of consideration for the Mexican side in the first place. What it actually reflects, however, is that those Mexican-American Liga Mx players haven't followed a consistent youth process that enables them to compete against American players who have, and against American imports from Bundesliga and Eredivisie.

Indeed, the USMNT roster for the friendly games in Denmark and Switzerland is full of men scouted abroad: Aron Johannsson, Danny Williams, John Brooks, Tim Chandler, Alfredo Morales, Michael Orozco, Greg Garza, Fabian Johnson, Julian Green, plus the abovementioned Yarbrough and Alvarado. Homegrown talent (defined as individuals who both played for MLS youth ranks and US underage teams) accounts for hardly 12 out of 23 footballers. Almost a fifty-fifty proportion unthinkable for certain national sides such as Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia and Belgium.

Things were not always like this for Klinsmann. When he took over the national job, many good American players were plying their trade in the Premier League, Serie A and Jupiter League to name but a few European leagues. As soon as early 2014, nonetheless, the MLS began repatriation of those good players that everyone knows and the pool of eligible ones shrank dramatically.

Klinsmann's Mexican quest is actually an international quest that stands for a constant scouting program that sometimes turns into free riding, since the US grassroots levels are facing serious troubles which compromise the near future of the national squad. For foreign scouting should come as complementary to youth development, and not as a substitute.

Sao Paulo beats San Lorenzo using Brazilian tactics

   The stride hitherto perfect of Corinthians within Libertadores's group of death implies that the clashes between Sao Paulo FC and current monarchs San Lorenzo de Almagro will likely determine the second ticket to the cup's next stage. In the first round of this fight between Brazilians and Argentines, the Sao Paulo boss Muricy Ramalho resorted to the most Brazilian of formations: the 4-2-2-2, otherwise known as "the magic square", which allowed the home side to retain possession and generate width against an opposition that seemed happy with the finally foiled draw.

Edgardo Bauza, the coach who has lifted two Libertadores with Ecuadorean Liga de Quito and his current side, is renowned as a true pragmatist. For San Lorenzo -despite playing against a Sao Paulo currently struggling at the regional Paulista championship- executed the very same tactics that were deployed in Morocco against Real Madrid for the FIFA Club World Cup.  Two banks of four plus two forwards (4-4-2). The tactical surprises that defined the negativity of this approach were the lineup of holding midfielder Franco Mussis as a right winger to provide extra cover on that flank, and using Pablo Barrientos as the side's left winger. These surprises in turn meant very few upsurges by the more than decent full-backs Emmanuel Mas and Julio Buffarini. 

Sao Paulo, however, started with the usual 4-4-2 diamond formation which failed against Corinthians, but here it counted with the promising appearance of Alexandre Pato in one of the two center-forward spots alongside Luis Fabiano. It only took 40 seconds for Pato to drop to the right channel and cross for a brilliant Michel Bastos's header that hit the post. Sadly, Pato left the pitch through injury, replaced by Argentine Ricardo Centurión, whose trickery with the ball was paradoxically the only thing Brazilian for the rest of the first half.

                                                                                                                                                                 

             

Ramalho used that substitution to modify his formation, yet the change from midfield diamond to magic square wasn't straightforward as Bastos and Paulo Henrique Ganso switched flanks constantly. One did tell the implementation of the 4-2-2-2 because Bastos, being himself left-footed, played on the right flank for large spells of the second half (for his winner, the former Olympique Lyonnais man stayed abnormally wide and thus absolutely free of cover to attack goalkeeper Torrico's near post). The same applied in Ganso's movements: the two Sao Paulo wingers came inside from wide positions, overloaded the center of the pitch and produced ball possession; allowed the upsurges of the full-backs and stretched the attacking zone. Left full-back Carlinhos, undisputedly the man of the match, crossed for the winner and was quite close to open the score himself minutes earlier after receiving a brilliant through-ball by Ganso (see vine).

In spite of their cautious tactics, San Lorenzo had a couple of dangerous chances when Emmanuel Mas beat Sao Paulo's radically advanced defensive line and when substitute Leandro Romagnoli retained possession through dribbling. This illustrates the risks implicit to the magic square: it pushes the full-backs so high in the pitch that a simple long ball aimed towards the flanks is enough to counterattack at pace. In all likelihood Edgardo Bauza will modify his approach in Buenos Aires and introduce quick players on the flanks like Héctor Villalba and Gonzalo Verón.

The second ticket of the group of death is certainly still up for grabs although Sao Paulo holds a better hand: the draw benefits them and this should allow for a patient counterattacking strategy that gambles on San Lorenzo's desperation. Ramalho has proved astute and brave on the chalkboard here, a true pragmatist too, using the most Brazilian of tactics.

This Boca Juniors is new names, old ways

The 5-0 thrashing of Venezuelan Zamora FC in Buenos Aires gave a rash boost of confidence to a Boca Juniors squad which now, being seeded within an affordable group and having won all of their matches so far, aims towards the top post in this Libertadores's last 16. Paradoxically, the new names found in the current roster -Nico Lodeiro and Pablo Daniel Osvaldo protruding amongst them- play the old and ruthless ways that raised Boca to continental glory in the not so far past. 

The quintessential Xeneixe formula is as known as powerful: build reliable partnerships along the different bands no matter whether the tactical shape is a 4-4-2, a 4-2-3-1 or a 4-3-3.

In this vein, the Boca Juniors version that conquered Libertadores in 2007 is remembered for the two basic partnerships built both in the midfield and the attack. Then Boca coach, Miguel Ángel Russo, used to line up a holding duo comprised by protector Pablo Ledesma and creator Éver Banega; likewise, Juan Román Riquelme was positioned -at least nominally- within the same band as target-man Martín Palermo as an industrious Rodrigo Palacio tracked enemy full backs and wingers in the defensive phase. Bianchi's Boca in Libertadores 2003 worked similarly: the midfield partnership was formed by destroyer Sebastián Battaglia and regista Diego Cagna, while the attack featured loads of mobility with Guillermo Barros Schelotto plus Carlos Tévez. Those winning versions of Boca, like many others not as successful, based their ruthlessness over partnerships which enabled the squad to soak up pressure and kill on the counteroffensive.

Boca version 2015, managed by former caudillo Rodolfo Vasco Arruabarrena, isn't that different. Against Zamora, what appeared at first glance as a 4-4-1-1 with Lodeiro and Osvaldo given attacking freedom, was actually a well-drilled 4-3-3 that could circulate the ball towards the flanks in possession (as seen in Boca's third goal from left winger Federico Carrizo).

The new partnerships, however, have certain details of complexity. In the middle, Cristian Erbes acts as the man who protects Boca's defensive line with his positioning and Fernando Gago provides the passing guile on the left. More different is the role of the right midfielder, César Meli, who advances towards the space vacated by Lodeiro's cutting inside in order to feed Osvaldo through crossing. The nature of Boca's midfield determines the attack: the former Southampton and Internazionale forward stays central and the Uruguayan international comes inside to assume the classic number 10 role.

Arruabarrena must feel lucky his side's got some high-profile signings during the winter window which theoretically raise the quality from the same side that lost sorely in semifinals of Copa Sudamericana to archrivals River Plate a couple of months ago.

With the incoming players, Boca now raises greater expectations within a tournament whose format appears tailor-made for this club. Just consider that, with humbler rosters, Boca Juniors reached the final in 2012 and eliminated then reigning champions Corinthians in quarter finals in 2013. That's largely because this club has a blueprint of tactical cruelty and -you may want to call it- dirtiness. As mentioned above, their current group has proved manageable and a fortunate draw will surely place Xeneixes to compete until the very late stages. New names, old ways.

A very conservative Tigres side allows River Plate brilliance

    Marcelo Gallardo's side managed to overcome both their regretful turf and a clumsy goal allowed by poor defending to draw a match that represents moral victory. The usual narrowness of River Plate's midfield diamond, however, wasn't tested by a Tigres squad that resorted to a five-man defensive line in which the wing backs didn't attempt any overlaps, thus isolating an otherwise dangerous attack. By the final whistle, River had outplayed their opposition in everything but the score.

Tigres, which saliently is a more expensive team in terms of individual market value than River Plate, according to a Brazilian consultancy firm, is a club widely renowned in the Mexican media for its traditional disdain to Copa Libertadores. Although in fairness to Tigres, many Mexican sides share that disdain/incapacity at the international level being the case that, for instance, domestic hegemon club León endured an early elimination last year to Bolivia's Bolívar. Tigres boss Ricardo Ferretti, apparently fed up with these criticisms, selected a 5-2-3 formation full of South American expertise with Libertadores champions Ecuadorean Joffre Guerrón and Brazilian Rafael Sobis in attack, plus Copa América winner Egidio Arévalo-Ríos in midfield.
         

River Plate, on the other hand, resorted to its prototypical 4-4-2 diamond formation with Leo Pisculichi at the tip, flanked by shuttlers Ariel Rojas and Carlos Sánchez. Colombian striker Teo Gutiérrez and Uruguayan striker Rodrigo Mora formed the offensive partnership but, fundamentally, also drifted to the channels to provide the width given the lack of true wingers this system entails. Considering the inclusion of Matías Kranevitter in the place of Leo Ponzio as the lone holding midfielder, this River Plate side remains unchanged from the squad that lifted the Copa Sudamericana some months ago.

As one can tell from the head image, the game's main tactical feature was Tigres's Guido Pizarro, deployed usually as a holding midfielder alongside Arévalo-Ríos in the Mexican league, playing as the sweeper within a trio of center backs. On paper that should've cancelled the Gutiérrez-Mora threat (and it did at least in what refers to protecting Nahuel Guzman's inner box), but the Mexican wing backs, Torres Nilo and Jiménez, stuck extremely close to their own goal line. This in turn left the middle of the pitch available to the workings of Pisculichi and, more important, to the surprise upsurges of Carlos Sánchez, who must have equalised well before his impressive scissor kick found the back of the net.

With the midfield completely surrendered by Tigres (whose basic strategy for that zone appeared to be committing cynical fouls to stop River's passing) the home side almost reached excellence with the ball. The numbers are cold but trustworthy: River shot 21 times (seven on target); Tigres, 6 times (four on target). Possession went 65 percent versus 35 percent. Peculiarly enough, the Mexican club resembled the cautious tactics and the radically conservative approach that the Mexican national team employed at the World Cup against the Netherlands once it took the early lead.

Other South American teams, most notably Atlético Nacional de Medellín and San Lorenzo de Almagro, have used a combination of full backs, wing backs and wingers to stretch the offensive play and drag River's diamond out of position. Of course, those matches were finals themselves and, in this case, Tigres were more than happy with collecting the away point. As it is likely that both teams will make it past group stage, we'll have to wait to see if River can show this level of brilliance against more adventurous opposition.