Uruguay 3-0 Colombia: Tabárez's solutions, Pékerman's troubles

 The decision-making of Óscar Tabárez and Néstor Pékerman in Uruguay and Colombia can't be more dissimilar now: the former copes with the absence of his world class Cavani-Suárez striker partnership due to suspension, while the latter enjoys such a deep pool of talent in quest for a way to fit it all within the same squad. The Montevideo clash showed a Uruguay of no glare, but cohesive and ruthless, and a Colombia of glare, but too imbalanced and fragile.

Although the Colombia boss didn't have James Rodríguez, he used instead decent playmaker Edwin Cardona from the start and later in the second half introduced another ball-playing midfielder in MacNelly Torres without subbing Cardona. Indeed, the use of Freddy Guarín shuttling to the right of holding midfielder Carlos Sánchez was reminiscent of the midfield diamond used by Roberto Mancini at Internazionale with Guarín in the very same role. Juan Guillermo Cuadrado, however, began the match wide on the left wing flanking Cardona and thus it was an unorthodox (and tipped) formation. Cuadrado's spot on the left, being right-footed himself, raised controversy amongst Colombian twitters, but Colombia's underperformance first and foremost was about tactical imbalance and just then about individual performances.

                                             

The image that heads this story is eloquent: whereas left full-back Frank Fabra is well protected by Cuadrado's tracking back, right full-back Santiago Arias is alone in front of oceans of space with no winger to double protect his channel. It only took some audacity by Uruguay's full-back Álvaro Pereira (as Martín Cáceres was early replaced through injury) to gain the bottom line and cross or provoke set pieces. All in all, Pékerman was justified to deploy two numbers nine - Bacca and Teo- with a complete platoon of creative players behind them as long as he surely expected Uruguay to seat deep with two banks of four and soak pressure up with 0-0 still on the score. Colombia's tactical imbalance became an issue when Uruguay took the lead via a Godín power header and thus Colombia had to chase the match. The home side sat deeper and exploited the wings yet again for the successive goals as Carlos Sánchez and Guarín were clearly outnumbered at covering the the pitch to the right. Teo should have tracked back, but he's proven great at running horizontally, not vertically.

The new troubles of Pékerman with Colombia seem rooted in his persistence on playing the whole offensive arsenal at expense of balance and width. The Copa América elimination to Argentina a few months ago was a similar match to this one in Montevideo: Pékerman fields a lone holding midfielder -that time it was Alexander Mejía- who clearly gets outnumbered by default formations such as 4-4-2 or 4-2-3-1/4-3-3. Against Argentina, his squad bled in the center of the pitch; with Uruguay, it bled over the flanks (see heatmap).

                             

The old solutions of Tabárez with Uruguay, as usual, seem rooted in the boss's recognitions of where Uruguay as a team has world class talent and where it has just decent players. It's noteworthy, however, that both Suárez and Cavani were absent and anyway the block remained cohesive and well organized. One is even tempted to say that, had Uruguay played a strikerless formation of 4-4-0,  they anyway would have relied on set pieces to score and on their two banks of four to maintain their lead and alienate the opposition. Formation and strategy permit the return of both strikers with the minimal previous work allowed by international football.

The Montevideo match between Uruguay and Colombia gives credence to South American qualifiers' reputation as the toughest of all. For they demand quick solutions and punish dearly those who get into tactical troubles.

Sacking Klinsmann now? the case of Tabárez's Uruguay

 US Soccer always differentiated from the rest of the hemispheric national teams in terms of the durability of its technical staff. Unlike Mexico, Brazil or Argentina, sides which have had half dozens, if not complete ones, of managers throughout the past decade, the USMNT can boast to have had only Arena, Bradley and JK in charge. Path dependence is certainly a good thing from a managerial point of view in football as the staff and its leadership are given time to learn by doing, change, develop and improve.

During the nineties, old-guard world beaters Uruguay were enmeshed into mediocrity, anarchy and absolute failure at trying to qualify to any of that decade's World Cups (if Italy 1990, to which they did qualify, is taken as one from the eighties). Coaches came and went to no avail: La Celeste's exodus far from World Cups lasted 12 years until qualification happened just to endure a group-stage exit in Korea and Japan 2002 to Denmark and Senegal. After that, Uruguay's FA didn't seem to change that much and the unsuccessful path to Germany 2006 was divided between the tenures of Juan Ramón Carrasco and Jorge Fossati.

Following the loss to Australia in penalty kicks in Sidney for the WC continental playoff, Fossati remained but soon he got sacked in favor of Óscar Washington El Maestro Tabárez, whose first challenge in the national job was the 2007 edition of Copa América. There, Uruguay gained momentum and fell short to reaching that tournament's final when Dunga's Brazil beat them... in penalty kicks. As Conmebol's deadly qualifiers loomed for South Africa 2010, Tabárez began introducing young talents like Palermo's Edinson Cavani and Ajax's Luis Suárez. La Celeste finished fifth and sealed its qualification dramatically against a Costa Rican side that just needed one away goal in the continental playoff second leg in Montevideo. Anyway, Tabárez's guys made it to South Africa and the rest is well-known history.

What few see beyond the diehard style and ruthlessness of contemporary Uruguay is that Tabárez actually took the whole shop apart. El Maestro isn't only in charge of the senior squad, but also of the grassroots levels within an integrated and vertical structure of scouting, applied technology and communication with the coaches of the under-age national teams. For all of its old glory, Uruguay was almost nonexistent in junior competitions and following 2007 they can mention more than decent participations in u20 and u17 World Cups: 2007 in Canada, 2011 in Mexico, 2013 in Turkey. The durability of Tabárez's second tenure is certain to generate the path dependence and positive feedback much needed at infusing new generations with the best of the old national identities and styles of play to look forward into future.

The lesson for US Soccer is that no matter what happens in the October 10 showdown against Mexico for the ticket to the 2017 Confederations Cup, Klinsmann must remain in charge. The two successive WC qualifications of Tabárez's Uruguay were possible too with massive doses of good luck: both achieved through continental playoffs, the berth to Brazil 2014 just clinched in the Conmebol's fifth place spot as the host country was already qualified. In the almost ten years since Tabárez took over the national job, Uruguay also suffered an ignominious early exit in the 2012 London Olympics and, at the end of the day, the Uruguayan FA stuck tight with El Maestro.

Sacking Klinsmann and bringing in a new coach perhaps could provoke a rush of blood to the squad that might yield good results on a temporary basis. Those good results, however, are to be expected irrespective of the coach as the only competitive matches coming in the horizon are Concacaf WC qualifiers. Sacking Klinsmann now would equate to having sacked Tabárez after any of the many bad results Uruguay got in its respective paths to the 2010 and 2014 World Cups. If that little country's case has some thing to offer to the enormous US Soccer, that some thing is that path dependence and durability in football are good things.