What's behind Klinsmann's Mexican quest?

The current fuss in México's footballing environment raised by the call-ups to the US national team for Ventura Alvarado and William Yarbrough may make us neglect the serious troubles that Jurgen Klinsmann now has. Such are the limitations within US Soccer grassroots levels that the California-based German boss pursues a selection agenda based on foreign scouting and -you may wanna call it- free riding.

As tough as 'free riding' sounds, I believe the concept fits this situation. A good illustration of it is the fuss raised back in 2008 when Ivan Rakitic, amongst many other Swiss-born Croatian players, switched allegiance from Switzerland to Croatia. During that year's European Championships, co-organized by the former country, it wasn't uncommon to hear angry Swiss fans supporting every rival that the latter country had within the tournament. "The thing is that players like him (Rakitic) and Mladen Petric (former Dortmund and Hamburg striker) have benefited from our youth ranks system and also from playing in our clubs so they could jump to big Bundesliga sides and now, quite talented as they are, they turn their backs on us by playing for Croatia ", went the Swiss rant.

The scheme is the following: within a world of ever-increasing migration trends, a national federation whose domestic youth ranks system is unable to feed its national side with an adequate pool of eligible players must look for talent abroad by means of constant scouting. Of course, a constant foreign scouting program sometimes implies tug-of-wars with foreign federations, foreign clubs, foreign media and foreign egos.

When Mexico coach Miguel Herrera went unapologetic by remarking that the Club León goalkeeper Yarbrough was only one amongst other eight or nine Mexican goalies, he was in fact reflecting the big egocentrism that pervades Mexican football when it comes to players being lured by US Soccer: that's reminiscent of the cases of Francisco Torres and Edgar Castillo. When these players end up finding little to none playing time with the United States at major tournaments such as World Cups, Mexican pundits regard this as confirmation of an alleged lack of talent that wasn't worthy of consideration for the Mexican side in the first place. What it actually reflects, however, is that those Mexican-American Liga Mx players haven't followed a consistent youth process that enables them to compete against American players who have, and against American imports from Bundesliga and Eredivisie.

Indeed, the USMNT roster for the friendly games in Denmark and Switzerland is full of men scouted abroad: Aron Johannsson, Danny Williams, John Brooks, Tim Chandler, Alfredo Morales, Michael Orozco, Greg Garza, Fabian Johnson, Julian Green, plus the abovementioned Yarbrough and Alvarado. Homegrown talent (defined as individuals who both played for MLS youth ranks and US underage teams) accounts for hardly 12 out of 23 footballers. Almost a fifty-fifty proportion unthinkable for certain national sides such as Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia and Belgium.

Things were not always like this for Klinsmann. When he took over the national job, many good American players were plying their trade in the Premier League, Serie A and Jupiter League to name but a few European leagues. As soon as early 2014, nonetheless, the MLS began repatriation of those good players that everyone knows and the pool of eligible ones shrank dramatically.

Klinsmann's Mexican quest is actually an international quest that stands for a constant scouting program that sometimes turns into free riding, since the US grassroots levels are facing serious troubles which compromise the near future of the national squad. For foreign scouting should come as complementary to youth development, and not as a substitute.

Sao Paulo beats San Lorenzo using Brazilian tactics

   The stride hitherto perfect of Corinthians within Libertadores's group of death implies that the clashes between Sao Paulo FC and current monarchs San Lorenzo de Almagro will likely determine the second ticket to the cup's next stage. In the first round of this fight between Brazilians and Argentines, the Sao Paulo boss Muricy Ramalho resorted to the most Brazilian of formations: the 4-2-2-2, otherwise known as "the magic square", which allowed the home side to retain possession and generate width against an opposition that seemed happy with the finally foiled draw.

Edgardo Bauza, the coach who has lifted two Libertadores with Ecuadorean Liga de Quito and his current side, is renowned as a true pragmatist. For San Lorenzo -despite playing against a Sao Paulo currently struggling at the regional Paulista championship- executed the very same tactics that were deployed in Morocco against Real Madrid for the FIFA Club World Cup.  Two banks of four plus two forwards (4-4-2). The tactical surprises that defined the negativity of this approach were the lineup of holding midfielder Franco Mussis as a right winger to provide extra cover on that flank, and using Pablo Barrientos as the side's left winger. These surprises in turn meant very few upsurges by the more than decent full-backs Emmanuel Mas and Julio Buffarini. 

Sao Paulo, however, started with the usual 4-4-2 diamond formation which failed against Corinthians, but here it counted with the promising appearance of Alexandre Pato in one of the two center-forward spots alongside Luis Fabiano. It only took 40 seconds for Pato to drop to the right channel and cross for a brilliant Michel Bastos's header that hit the post. Sadly, Pato left the pitch through injury, replaced by Argentine Ricardo Centurión, whose trickery with the ball was paradoxically the only thing Brazilian for the rest of the first half.

                                                                                                                                                                 

             

Ramalho used that substitution to modify his formation, yet the change from midfield diamond to magic square wasn't straightforward as Bastos and Paulo Henrique Ganso switched flanks constantly. One did tell the implementation of the 4-2-2-2 because Bastos, being himself left-footed, played on the right flank for large spells of the second half (for his winner, the former Olympique Lyonnais man stayed abnormally wide and thus absolutely free of cover to attack goalkeeper Torrico's near post). The same applied in Ganso's movements: the two Sao Paulo wingers came inside from wide positions, overloaded the center of the pitch and produced ball possession; allowed the upsurges of the full-backs and stretched the attacking zone. Left full-back Carlinhos, undisputedly the man of the match, crossed for the winner and was quite close to open the score himself minutes earlier after receiving a brilliant through-ball by Ganso (see vine).

In spite of their cautious tactics, San Lorenzo had a couple of dangerous chances when Emmanuel Mas beat Sao Paulo's radically advanced defensive line and when substitute Leandro Romagnoli retained possession through dribbling. This illustrates the risks implicit to the magic square: it pushes the full-backs so high in the pitch that a simple long ball aimed towards the flanks is enough to counterattack at pace. In all likelihood Edgardo Bauza will modify his approach in Buenos Aires and introduce quick players on the flanks like Héctor Villalba and Gonzalo Verón.

The second ticket of the group of death is certainly still up for grabs although Sao Paulo holds a better hand: the draw benefits them and this should allow for a patient counterattacking strategy that gambles on San Lorenzo's desperation. Ramalho has proved astute and brave on the chalkboard here, a true pragmatist too, using the most Brazilian of tactics.

This Boca Juniors is new names, old ways

The 5-0 thrashing of Venezuelan Zamora FC in Buenos Aires gave a rash boost of confidence to a Boca Juniors squad which now, being seeded within an affordable group and having won all of their matches so far, aims towards the top post in this Libertadores's last 16. Paradoxically, the new names found in the current roster -Nico Lodeiro and Pablo Daniel Osvaldo protruding amongst them- play the old and ruthless ways that raised Boca to continental glory in the not so far past. 

The quintessential Xeneixe formula is as known as powerful: build reliable partnerships along the different bands no matter whether the tactical shape is a 4-4-2, a 4-2-3-1 or a 4-3-3.

In this vein, the Boca Juniors version that conquered Libertadores in 2007 is remembered for the two basic partnerships built both in the midfield and the attack. Then Boca coach, Miguel Ángel Russo, used to line up a holding duo comprised by protector Pablo Ledesma and creator Éver Banega; likewise, Juan Román Riquelme was positioned -at least nominally- within the same band as target-man Martín Palermo as an industrious Rodrigo Palacio tracked enemy full backs and wingers in the defensive phase. Bianchi's Boca in Libertadores 2003 worked similarly: the midfield partnership was formed by destroyer Sebastián Battaglia and regista Diego Cagna, while the attack featured loads of mobility with Guillermo Barros Schelotto plus Carlos Tévez. Those winning versions of Boca, like many others not as successful, based their ruthlessness over partnerships which enabled the squad to soak up pressure and kill on the counteroffensive.

Boca version 2015, managed by former caudillo Rodolfo Vasco Arruabarrena, isn't that different. Against Zamora, what appeared at first glance as a 4-4-1-1 with Lodeiro and Osvaldo given attacking freedom, was actually a well-drilled 4-3-3 that could circulate the ball towards the flanks in possession (as seen in Boca's third goal from left winger Federico Carrizo).

The new partnerships, however, have certain details of complexity. In the middle, Cristian Erbes acts as the man who protects Boca's defensive line with his positioning and Fernando Gago provides the passing guile on the left. More different is the role of the right midfielder, César Meli, who advances towards the space vacated by Lodeiro's cutting inside in order to feed Osvaldo through crossing. The nature of Boca's midfield determines the attack: the former Southampton and Internazionale forward stays central and the Uruguayan international comes inside to assume the classic number 10 role.

Arruabarrena must feel lucky his side's got some high-profile signings during the winter window which theoretically raise the quality from the same side that lost sorely in semifinals of Copa Sudamericana to archrivals River Plate a couple of months ago.

With the incoming players, Boca now raises greater expectations within a tournament whose format appears tailor-made for this club. Just consider that, with humbler rosters, Boca Juniors reached the final in 2012 and eliminated then reigning champions Corinthians in quarter finals in 2013. That's largely because this club has a blueprint of tactical cruelty and -you may want to call it- dirtiness. As mentioned above, their current group has proved manageable and a fortunate draw will surely place Xeneixes to compete until the very late stages. New names, old ways.

A very conservative Tigres side allows River Plate brilliance

    Marcelo Gallardo's side managed to overcome both their regretful turf and a clumsy goal allowed by poor defending to draw a match that represents moral victory. The usual narrowness of River Plate's midfield diamond, however, wasn't tested by a Tigres squad that resorted to a five-man defensive line in which the wing backs didn't attempt any overlaps, thus isolating an otherwise dangerous attack. By the final whistle, River had outplayed their opposition in everything but the score.

Tigres, which saliently is a more expensive team in terms of individual market value than River Plate, according to a Brazilian consultancy firm, is a club widely renowned in the Mexican media for its traditional disdain to Copa Libertadores. Although in fairness to Tigres, many Mexican sides share that disdain/incapacity at the international level being the case that, for instance, domestic hegemon club León endured an early elimination last year to Bolivia's Bolívar. Tigres boss Ricardo Ferretti, apparently fed up with these criticisms, selected a 5-2-3 formation full of South American expertise with Libertadores champions Ecuadorean Joffre Guerrón and Brazilian Rafael Sobis in attack, plus Copa América winner Egidio Arévalo-Ríos in midfield.
         

River Plate, on the other hand, resorted to its prototypical 4-4-2 diamond formation with Leo Pisculichi at the tip, flanked by shuttlers Ariel Rojas and Carlos Sánchez. Colombian striker Teo Gutiérrez and Uruguayan striker Rodrigo Mora formed the offensive partnership but, fundamentally, also drifted to the channels to provide the width given the lack of true wingers this system entails. Considering the inclusion of Matías Kranevitter in the place of Leo Ponzio as the lone holding midfielder, this River Plate side remains unchanged from the squad that lifted the Copa Sudamericana some months ago.

As one can tell from the head image, the game's main tactical feature was Tigres's Guido Pizarro, deployed usually as a holding midfielder alongside Arévalo-Ríos in the Mexican league, playing as the sweeper within a trio of center backs. On paper that should've cancelled the Gutiérrez-Mora threat (and it did at least in what refers to protecting Nahuel Guzman's inner box), but the Mexican wing backs, Torres Nilo and Jiménez, stuck extremely close to their own goal line. This in turn left the middle of the pitch available to the workings of Pisculichi and, more important, to the surprise upsurges of Carlos Sánchez, who must have equalised well before his impressive scissor kick found the back of the net.

With the midfield completely surrendered by Tigres (whose basic strategy for that zone appeared to be committing cynical fouls to stop River's passing) the home side almost reached excellence with the ball. The numbers are cold but trustworthy: River shot 21 times (seven on target); Tigres, 6 times (four on target). Possession went 65 percent versus 35 percent. Peculiarly enough, the Mexican club resembled the cautious tactics and the radically conservative approach that the Mexican national team employed at the World Cup against the Netherlands once it took the early lead.

Other South American teams, most notably Atlético Nacional de Medellín and San Lorenzo de Almagro, have used a combination of full backs, wing backs and wingers to stretch the offensive play and drag River's diamond out of position. Of course, those matches were finals themselves and, in this case, Tigres were more than happy with collecting the away point. As it is likely that both teams will make it past group stage, we'll have to wait to see if River can show this level of brilliance against more adventurous opposition.

Copa Libertadores's just found its own Atlético de Madrid

   Granted, most attempts to decode South American football tactics using European standards are simplistic and unfair to South American squads and their managers. But the Emelec side of Argentine-born Bolivian boss Gustavo Quinteros -who is to take over the Ecuadorean national team for Copa América- has some significant resemblances with Simeone's Atlético de Madrid. Most notably, their compact 4-4-2 formation, their patient approach without the ball and their use of a Diego Costa type center-forward: Miller Bolaños. That should make Emelec a tough rival in this Copa Libertadores and even a potential dark horse.

Emelec, current monarchs of the Ecuadorean Serie A, have so far outfoxed Universidad de Chile in Santiago for the opening match of Group Four (0-1), and outplayed Bolivian club The Strongest (3-0) for matchday two at home (played in Manta city due to renewal works of their George Capwell Stadium in Guayaquil). As one can tell from the above image against the Chilean team, they hardly modify their 4-4-2 formation both in possession and without it.

What makes their strategic approach extraordinarily similar to that of Atlético de Madrid is the bonus feature that Quinteros can deploy either natural wingers or inverted wingers (Ángel Mena, being left-footed, played the first match on the right flank while the second one he operated on the left) depending on depth-or-width necessities. Just like Arda Turan or Saúl Ñíguez in current versions of Atleti. Arguably, playing U de Chile away was best suited for a patient counter-attacking stance in which the wingers could occupy the interior zones left vacated by Bolaños and Luis Escalada's horizontal movement (as the Bolaños-Mena combination for the winner goal confirmed). The opposite stance, wingers providing width, worked brilliantly against weaker opposition in Manta.

In both matches, however, Emelec recorded lower percentages of ball possession and lower rates of pass success. This may indicate a preference for a more direct transition game in the channels as Pedro Quiñónez and Osbaldo Lastra, the holding midfield duo, actually lack passing accuracy.

The embedded vine above shows Bolaños's opener against The Strongest. Within the frame, one can observe Luis Escaladas's great cross from the right, which in turn was enabled by Mauro Fernández motoring forward in a quick counterattack from a corner kick. Outside the frame, nonetheless, one can't observe Bolaños's cynical tackle at the birth of that attack, taking down his marker while the referee was focused on the other side of the pitch. That defines Bolaños: a smart striker whose pace and dribbling abilities can turn him into an electric winger whenever the flux of play makes it mandatory, and a ruthless finisher whose gamesmanship turns him into the quintessential South American forward.

With two solid victories in a row, this Copa Libertadores's Atlético de Madrid stand a good chance to make it to the next stage. The doubts, of course, rise when one remembers that Quinteros will soon depart to take the Ecuador job. This may sound bad news for Emelec (and they are indeed), but given Reynaldo Rueda's cagey tactics in the World Cup, these can be great news for incoming Copa América.

Corinthians 2-0 Sao Paulo: Cohesion versus separation

   In the Arena Corinthians the home side thoroughly overplayed their city rivals, Sao Paulo FC, by quick aggression attacking both from the outside (pushing with the full-backs Fabio Santos and Fagner), and from the inside, (surprising with box-to-box midfielder Elias). After the opener, the Timao soaked pressure up with the very same cohesion deployed at attack. Sao Paulo, on the other hand, showed themselves as quite disjointed a squad with three men (Luis Fabiano, Alan Kardec and Paulo Henrique Ganso) in charge of offending and the rest taking the brunt of defensive duties.

The Corinthians boss, Tite, chose what actually is a 4-3-3 formation: Renato Augusto (the launcher) and Elias (the runner) stuck close to Ralf (the protector) in midfield, while Danilo came on for suspended Peruvian central striker Paolo Guerrero, moving constantly away from the Sao Paulo center-backs. This latter vertical mobility proved crucial as Corinthians overloaded the center of the pitch and controlled the flux of play. The image that precedes these lines being a good example, Elias's gol was created from a nice combination between him and Danilo to surpass Denilson with the assistance of a great Jadson lobbed ball.

                    

The formation employed by Muricy Ramalho was a wingerless midfield diamond (4-3-1-2) in which Ganso performed the trequartista role, and both Luis Fabiano and Alan Kardec failed to move to the channels to provide the much-needed width given the lack of true wingers. In fairness to Ramalho, he could not use Alexandre Pato, a more versatile striker, since he's in loan from Corinthians, and could not use either Ricardo Centurión, the Argentine winger brought from Racing de Avellaneda, due to suspension. The problems for Sao Paulo, however, had more to do with their little cohesion rather than with some certain formation.

Until the Elias's opener eleven minutes from the start of the match, Corinthians pushed Fagner and Fabio Santos in support of Jadson and Emerson (who regularly cut in from the channels). As Denilson, Souza and Maicon were occupied with Elias and Renato Augusto, Corinthians caused one-two situations against the Sao Paulo full-backs almost by default. Even at those early stages Fabio Santos had shot twice against Rogerio Ceni's goal. As the Sao Paulo forward trio was almost totally oblivious to defending, Souza and Maicon faced this impossible dilemma: Should we track the Corinthians full-backs at expense of exposing the midfield, or should we stay in position at expense of exposing the flanks?

The midfielders of Sao Paulo tried to cover both the center and the flanks and, at the end, got caught by Danilo's false nine movement, Renato Augusto's fine passing and Elias' impressive work rate. Had they counted with some help from upfront, they could perhaps offer more in an attacking sense to exploit the space left behind the enemy full-backs. Instead, Corinthians have once again shown their cards as a cohesive squad that moves along the field as a unit but, more importantly, as a well-drilled machine that creates and exploits space from the inside and the outside.

América 1-0 Pumas ¡Triunfo táctico para Universidad!

   De las cuatro llaves de cuartos de final, la que a priori parecía más desigual, el uno contra el ocho, América contra Pumas, resultó ser la llave más cerrada y (tácticamente hablando) la más compleja de la liguilla. Tan cerrada fue que el superlíder y campeón debió decidir a través de una acción de pelota quieta (el gol de Goltz a tiro de esquina) y también gracias a su mejor posición en la tabla general sobre el club Universidad.

Por supuesto el choque no resultó de ida y vuelta ni de grandes ocasiones porque ello hubiera significado una estrategia de riesgos innecesarios para los Pumas ¿Por qué abrirte a atacar si tienes el 1-0 a favor cosechado en casa y el rival no anotó de visitante?

De este modo, el duelo se cerró a iniciativa de Memo Vázquez y el éxito de su estrategia puede verse en los porcentajes de pases completos de una y otra escuadra así como en la naturaleza de estos pases como se aprecia en la siguiente gráfica:

Tomado de Squawka.com

América tuvo casi el 80% de efectividad en pases por el 74% de Pumas (estadísticas parejas, pero también tasas de efectividad relativamente bajas comparadas a juegos de Champions League o a partidos más abiertos en Liga Mx). Lo que esto quiere decir es que América, el obligado por el marcador, fue incapaz de filtrar balones, por tierra o por aire, desde medio campo y por ello sus pases fallidos (en morado según la gráfica de arriba) son precisamente sus pases verticales. Es decir, América pasó bien (líneas verdes según la misma gráfica) hacia los lados y hacia atrás, pero pasó mal hacia adelante y esto sólo puede explicarse por el trabajo táctico en el medio campo auriazul.

Como se desprende del diagrama táctico que encabeza este texto, América y Pumas formaron líneas de cuatro en defensa. Sin embargo, mientras Mohamed jugó con cuatro mediocampistas, Vázquez jugó con cinco. Dante López y Javier Cortés, los volantes abiertos, se ocuparon de bloquear la salida de los laterales azulcremas; de este modo Pumas jugó en el centro del campo con David Cabrera, Martín Romagnoli e Ismael Sosa contra Jesús Molina, Rubens Sambueza, Miguel Layún y el 'Quick' Mendoza (3 contra 4; inferioridad numérica para Pumas).

La clave para Vázquez entonces estuvo en la elección para la posición de diez (también llamado enganche o mediapunta). Alinear a un enganche tradicional hubiese supuesto servir el partido en bandeja de plata al América porque Molina hubiese tomado esa marca personal y Sambueza hubiese quedado libre. Por ello Daniel Ludueña fue descartado e ingresó al quite Ismael Sosa. Éste jugó nominalmente de enganche, pero lo cierto es que se retrasó a marcar junto a Cabrera y Romagnoli para cubrir a Sambueza y dejar libre a Molina. Tú cubres al ofensivo y tú dejas libre al inofensivo. Jaque mate a favor de Memo Vázquez.

Para la escuadra de Vázquez, tan bien trabajada en jugada con pelota en movimiento, debió suponer un baldazo de agua fría el haber perdido el partido en jugada con pelota quieta. Si de algo sirve ante el odiado rival, los universitarios pueden decir que lograron el triunfo táctico que deja buenas sensaciones para la próxima campaña.