Sacking Klinsmann now? the case of Tabárez's Uruguay

 US Soccer always differentiated from the rest of the hemispheric national teams in terms of the durability of its technical staff. Unlike Mexico, Brazil or Argentina, sides which have had half dozens, if not complete ones, of managers throughout the past decade, the USMNT can boast to have had only Arena, Bradley and JK in charge. Path dependence is certainly a good thing from a managerial point of view in football as the staff and its leadership are given time to learn by doing, change, develop and improve.

During the nineties, old-guard world beaters Uruguay were enmeshed into mediocrity, anarchy and absolute failure at trying to qualify to any of that decade's World Cups (if Italy 1990, to which they did qualify, is taken as one from the eighties). Coaches came and went to no avail: La Celeste's exodus far from World Cups lasted 12 years until qualification happened just to endure a group-stage exit in Korea and Japan 2002 to Denmark and Senegal. After that, Uruguay's FA didn't seem to change that much and the unsuccessful path to Germany 2006 was divided between the tenures of Juan Ramón Carrasco and Jorge Fossati.

Following the loss to Australia in penalty kicks in Sidney for the WC continental playoff, Fossati remained but soon he got sacked in favor of Óscar Washington El Maestro Tabárez, whose first challenge in the national job was the 2007 edition of Copa América. There, Uruguay gained momentum and fell short to reaching that tournament's final when Dunga's Brazil beat them... in penalty kicks. As Conmebol's deadly qualifiers loomed for South Africa 2010, Tabárez began introducing young talents like Palermo's Edinson Cavani and Ajax's Luis Suárez. La Celeste finished fifth and sealed its qualification dramatically against a Costa Rican side that just needed one away goal in the continental playoff second leg in Montevideo. Anyway, Tabárez's guys made it to South Africa and the rest is well-known history.

What few see beyond the diehard style and ruthlessness of contemporary Uruguay is that Tabárez actually took the whole shop apart. El Maestro isn't only in charge of the senior squad, but also of the grassroots levels within an integrated and vertical structure of scouting, applied technology and communication with the coaches of the under-age national teams. For all of its old glory, Uruguay was almost nonexistent in junior competitions and following 2007 they can mention more than decent participations in u20 and u17 World Cups: 2007 in Canada, 2011 in Mexico, 2013 in Turkey. The durability of Tabárez's second tenure is certain to generate the path dependence and positive feedback much needed at infusing new generations with the best of the old national identities and styles of play to look forward into future.

The lesson for US Soccer is that no matter what happens in the October 10 showdown against Mexico for the ticket to the 2017 Confederations Cup, Klinsmann must remain in charge. The two successive WC qualifications of Tabárez's Uruguay were possible too with massive doses of good luck: both achieved through continental playoffs, the berth to Brazil 2014 just clinched in the Conmebol's fifth place spot as the host country was already qualified. In the almost ten years since Tabárez took over the national job, Uruguay also suffered an ignominious early exit in the 2012 London Olympics and, at the end of the day, the Uruguayan FA stuck tight with El Maestro.

Sacking Klinsmann and bringing in a new coach perhaps could provoke a rush of blood to the squad that might yield good results on a temporary basis. Those good results, however, are to be expected irrespective of the coach as the only competitive matches coming in the horizon are Concacaf WC qualifiers. Sacking Klinsmann now would equate to having sacked Tabárez after any of the many bad results Uruguay got in its respective paths to the 2010 and 2014 World Cups. If that little country's case has some thing to offer to the enormous US Soccer, that some thing is that path dependence and durability in football are good things.

What's behind Klinsmann's Mexican quest?

The current fuss in México's footballing environment raised by the call-ups to the US national team for Ventura Alvarado and William Yarbrough may make us neglect the serious troubles that Jurgen Klinsmann now has. Such are the limitations within US Soccer grassroots levels that the California-based German boss pursues a selection agenda based on foreign scouting and -you may wanna call it- free riding.

As tough as 'free riding' sounds, I believe the concept fits this situation. A good illustration of it is the fuss raised back in 2008 when Ivan Rakitic, amongst many other Swiss-born Croatian players, switched allegiance from Switzerland to Croatia. During that year's European Championships, co-organized by the former country, it wasn't uncommon to hear angry Swiss fans supporting every rival that the latter country had within the tournament. "The thing is that players like him (Rakitic) and Mladen Petric (former Dortmund and Hamburg striker) have benefited from our youth ranks system and also from playing in our clubs so they could jump to big Bundesliga sides and now, quite talented as they are, they turn their backs on us by playing for Croatia ", went the Swiss rant.

The scheme is the following: within a world of ever-increasing migration trends, a national federation whose domestic youth ranks system is unable to feed its national side with an adequate pool of eligible players must look for talent abroad by means of constant scouting. Of course, a constant foreign scouting program sometimes implies tug-of-wars with foreign federations, foreign clubs, foreign media and foreign egos.

When Mexico coach Miguel Herrera went unapologetic by remarking that the Club León goalkeeper Yarbrough was only one amongst other eight or nine Mexican goalies, he was in fact reflecting the big egocentrism that pervades Mexican football when it comes to players being lured by US Soccer: that's reminiscent of the cases of Francisco Torres and Edgar Castillo. When these players end up finding little to none playing time with the United States at major tournaments such as World Cups, Mexican pundits regard this as confirmation of an alleged lack of talent that wasn't worthy of consideration for the Mexican side in the first place. What it actually reflects, however, is that those Mexican-American Liga Mx players haven't followed a consistent youth process that enables them to compete against American players who have, and against American imports from Bundesliga and Eredivisie.

Indeed, the USMNT roster for the friendly games in Denmark and Switzerland is full of men scouted abroad: Aron Johannsson, Danny Williams, John Brooks, Tim Chandler, Alfredo Morales, Michael Orozco, Greg Garza, Fabian Johnson, Julian Green, plus the abovementioned Yarbrough and Alvarado. Homegrown talent (defined as individuals who both played for MLS youth ranks and US underage teams) accounts for hardly 12 out of 23 footballers. Almost a fifty-fifty proportion unthinkable for certain national sides such as Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia and Belgium.

Things were not always like this for Klinsmann. When he took over the national job, many good American players were plying their trade in the Premier League, Serie A and Jupiter League to name but a few European leagues. As soon as early 2014, nonetheless, the MLS began repatriation of those good players that everyone knows and the pool of eligible ones shrank dramatically.

Klinsmann's Mexican quest is actually an international quest that stands for a constant scouting program that sometimes turns into free riding, since the US grassroots levels are facing serious troubles which compromise the near future of the national squad. For foreign scouting should come as complementary to youth development, and not as a substitute.