River Plate 3-0 Tigres: to pounce and subdue

With a less expensive squad, fraught with injuries, suspensions and high-profile summer departures, River Plate took Tigres to a war of attrition -the previous three matches between them had ended all leveled- and finally broke the stalemate to prompt their rivals' collapse and collect their third Copa Libertadores. They did so basically by persisting in fielding two classic number nines, capitalizing the only one-on-one situation with the Tigres backline, and being clinical at set-pieces just as they were against Atlético Nacional in Copa Sudamericana six months ago.

For large spells of the first half -and considering the heavy rain- both teams didn't retain meaningful possession and the game became finals-like and dull: River couldn't because Ponzio and Kranevitter aren't gifted passers and Tigres weren't willing to because preferred counterattacking. In such a scenario the quick transition game of the Mexican side proved once again to be delivering when Funes Mori got attracted to Rafael Sobis and deflected poorly just for the Brazilian forward to make an equally poor reception and waste a clear chance. A few moments later, the Tigres right winger Jürgen Damm wreaked havoc in River's left flank only for André-Pierre Gignac to waste yet another chance for the visitors. For those very spells River Plate and Tigres became good reflections of their respective leagues: Liga Mx with play quicker and more incisive; Argentine First Division, more physical and strategic.

River netted the opener with an unexpected combination that goes against the locals' traditional flux of play: left full-back Leonel Vangioni took on Damm and crossed for Lucas Alario to head home between the Tigres center-back duo. As the above graphic shows, both Marcelo Gallardo and Ricardo Ferretti lined-up similar formations that appeared to cancel each other out as every field player had a direct cover reference. When Vangioni got past Damm, he suddenly enjoyed good time and space, but that successful challenge doesn't explain in itself why the Tigres four-man defensive line appeared so static. That has to do with Gallardo's persistence on fielding two classic number nines.

After Alario's goal, Mexican media claimed that the Argentine striker should have been sent off for two reckless tackles on Mexican full-back Jorge Torres Nilo and on goalkeeper Nahuel Guzmán. Alario's nasty maneuvers, however, were done over each one of Tigres' flanks: on the right corner first and on the left corner later, hence illustrating Alario's mobility and coordination with his attacking partner Fernando Cavenaghi. For River's first goal, the latter pulled wide to attract Juninho's cover and to open space for the former's header in a one-on-one situation against José Rivas. Credit should be given to Marcelo Gallardo who persisted in his system despite the fact of having neither Teo Gutiérrez nor Rodrigo Mora. 

The second goal was simply a sloppy tackle from Javier Aquino to his cover reference Carlos Sánchez, and the Uruguayan himself converted the resulting penalty kick. The third goal was pure Gallardo's River insofar as El Muñeco introduced Leonardo Pisculichi -whose left foot is well renowned after assisting for the goals of the Copa Sudamericana final- to curl in a corner kick for Ramiro Funes Mori to head home. It's truly noteworthy how River's goals against Atlético Nacional resemble the last one against Tigres and it makes one wonder whether Gallardo would have relied only on Pisculichi's magnificent set-pieces to maintain his side cohesive had the match gone towards extra time.

    

The attrition war proposed by River worked out as the Argentines brought the Mexicans onto a field of physicality and strategy. Tigres, nevertheless, did enjoy good chances when they managed to exploit their pace at counterattacks: incisiveness and clinical finishing is what they missed. River had both of them and thus we can fairly say that they pounced and subdued their expensive rivals to get continental silverware.

Tigres 0-0 River: Gallardo may retreat back (even more)

Key to River Plate's successful continental stride so far under Marcelo Gallardo have been the full-backs Leonel Vangioni and Gabriel Mercado. When Gallardo deployed a diamond in midfield with traditional playmaker Pisculichi and the squad became thus too narrow, both defenders thoroughly maintained their positions and formed a defensive line of four centre-backs that gave much solidity behind. That's why River gets ultra-competitive in finals and that's why they got a draw in Monterrey against Tigres that leaves all to be decided in Buenos Aires next week.

Gallardo, a traditional number ten himself as a player, got rid of his trademark diamond in favor of a more pragmatic 4-4-2 with no playmaker ahead of this Libertadores's first leg against Boca Juniors. The wingers, Uruguayans Carlos Sánchez and Tabaré Viudez, work their flanks so Mercado and Vangioni are scarcely exposed to the rival's full-backs and Matías Kranevitter brilliantly guards the front of his defense while Leo Ponzio harries whoever gets the ball. In front, Teo Gutiérrez used to drop and work the channels to provide the width lost by the cautiousness of Mercado and Vangioni. Recently signed forward Lucas Alario is completely different: the strategy with Rodrigo Mora against Tigres yesterday focused in making life difficult to Guido Pizarro, Tigres' holding midfielder.

As a result of harassing Pizarro and pushing him deep between the Tigres centre-backs, the Liga Mx side's game-building became a bit nervous and prone to making mistakes under pressure. Soon before Hugo Ayala was subbed off due to injury in the first half, he and Juninho got entangled with the ball, Nahuel Guzmán forced to sweep behind them, and Ayala knocked over by his own goalkeeper. In some ways Gallardo was astute enough to identify the key players in Tigres' tactical backbone (Pizarro, Rafael Sobis and André-Pierre Gignac) and isolate them with double covers. Maidana and Funes-Mori, River's central defenders, more often than not alienated and annoyed the Frenchman with harsh maneuvers; and Kranevitter negated Sobis any pocket of space between the lines with his positional awareness throwing him into Ponzio's custody. It's not strange then that Tigres boss Ricardo Ferretti instructed Sobis to exchange positions with Damián Álvarez in the left wing to form a 4-3-3 during the last minutes of the match when the locals got the best of a now shaky River Plate backline.

Despite the fact that Gallardo tells Vangioni and Mercado to keep position and be cohesive, River Plate get distressed when their opposition launches wingers and full-backs to attack high up the pitch. When faced with Edgardo Bauza's San Lorenzo at Recopa Sudamericana, full-backs Emmanuel Mas and Julio Buffarini showed that River bleeds at the outside. The best chances of Tigres came when right winger Jürgen Damm took on Vangioni: the first half promising cross that Sobis should have headered home, and the second half poor Vangioni tackle that left Damm alone in front of River's goalkeeper Marcelo Barovero. The flanks, the flanks, the flanks, appears to be the mantra for Ricardo Ferretti at Monumental de Núñez.

Gallardo may resort to promising young defender Emanuel Mammana to cover the absence of Mercado due to a second yellow card, but otherwise his side will be as expected from the Monterrey leg. Individually, Tigres seem a superior squad and pretty much well trained, but the Argentines should appeal at their crowds and Gallardo surely may retreat back (even more) to set his squad on 'finals mode'.

River 1-0 Boca: nastiness, gridlock and fight

     There's simply far too much at stake in any River-Boca that those always result in nasty fights, midfield gridlock and packed defenses. These are derbies so actually impassioned on and off the pitch that it doesn't matter whether they are playing friendly summer tournaments in Mendoza or Mar del Plata, the Argentine league for mere three points, or Copa Libertadores's elimination stages: nasty fights, midfield gridlock and packed defenses always prevail.

In truth, in terms of decision-making, the ball was on River's pitch. After their lackluster group stage and their 2-0 defeat to Boca in La Bombonera at the domestic competition days ago, River Plate might have felt that the midfield diamond formation that proved effective at dismantling Boca Juniors to lift Copa Sudamericana last semester was all quite well known to play it again. The diamond used to allow River boss Marcelo Gallardo to attack with five men including the likes of Teo Gutiérrez, Rodrigo Mora, Leo Pisculichi, Carlos Sánchez and Ariel Rojas and produce some spells of beautiful combination football, but it came at expense of being narrow and having the full-backs been told not to motor forward at all.

Therefore, Gallardo reverted to a plain 4-4-2 in which gifted playmaker Pisculichi was dropped to the bench and pure destroyers Leo Ponzio and Matías Kranevitter formed the holding midfield duo. As consequence, River reinforced their flanks and were less vulnerable to quick Boca transitions, but now they were attacking with only four or maybe three individuals (Teo, Mora and Sánchez). The full-backs, as it remains a constant in Gallardo's tenure, were stationed along the centre-backs.

The Boca boss Rodolfo Arruabarrena took somehow more peculiar choices. In his 4-3-3 system, Uruguayan number ten Nicolás Lodeiro is nominally deployed on one of the wings and the other goes for more traditional wingers such as Federico Carrizo and Cristian Pavón. This makes the actual formation to resemble more a 4-4-2 with the traditional winger tracking back and Lodeiro becoming a satellite forward behind a classic target man (surprisingly, Jonathan Calleri won the number nine spot against Pablo Osvaldo). The main shortcoming of a 4-3-3 switching ambiguously into a 4-4-2 is that the midfield components need time to settle in different roles at expense of a clear structure.

Fernando Gago, in this way, endured a tough night misplacing balls under pressure from Ponzio and Kranevitter and could not spray passes sideways either as River's settled 4-4-2 protected the flanks well with Sánchez and Driussi. Lodeiro dropped between the lines but Funes Mori was more than happy coming up to dispossess him with legal (and illegal) tackles. Calleri showed little mobility. It's then fair to say that River Plate thoroughly cancelled all potential Boca threats locking both sides into midfield stalemate.

             

Apart from his preference to always keep full-backs in defensive positions, Gallardo seems faithful to the forward partnership of Teo Gutiérrez and Rodrigo Mora because neither is a classic target man and, having really decent technical skills, both can drop and work the channels well. This provides River with the attacking width lost by their stationed full-backs and poises dillemmas onto Boca's four-man defensive line: should their full-backs motor forward and leave the centre-backs exposed to one-on-one situations with Teo and Mora? or should they be stationed themselves? Both situations happened and it was extraordinary to see Teo Gutiérrez dragging Cata Díaz out of position and winning a great deal of corner kicks for River (which weren't used efficiently as Pisculichi was on the bench). When Arruabarrena realized the danger posed by Teo's mobility, he instructed his full-backs to stay on line and the match got into more gridlock.

One should credit Marcelo Gallardo for making offensive subs taking Ponzio off and bringing in attacker Gonzalo Martínez on the left wing and placing Carlos Sánchez along Kranevitter. Martínez tried to drive past Leandro Marín within the box and the Boca full-back pulled him down for the penalty kick converted by Sánchez. Minutes later, Teo Gutiérrez was sent off and River Plate will sorely miss his best man in the second leg at La Bombonera.

In all, this was a nasty fight gridlocked in the midfield in which River Plate seemed more comfortable than Boca Juniors. Gallardo appear to have more tactical alternatives than Arruabarrena and this looks like River's long awaited vendetta for that cruel elimination to Boca in penalty shootouts in Libertadores 2004.

Danubio, the poorest and most loser side in Libertadores?

Commonsense in football journalism says it's ill-advised to write about poor and loser sides in any given competition; unless, of course, the poor and loser is a big club whose misery illustrates decadence and deterioration. Uruguayan side Danubio FC qualified to this Libertadores as reigning champions of their domestic league, and yet, their continental record this year can't be poorer: all games lost, the bottom place of their group already guaranteed with one match to go, fourteen goals conceded.

Having watched all of Danubio's losses so far, however, something keeps telling me I'll regret it for long if the chance to write about them is simply let pass by. That is because Danubio is not a poor and loser side: it is merely a too young one, if not entirely juvenile, that ran with the awful luck of being seeded within this Libertadores's Group of Death along current monarchs San Lorenzo and Paulista powerhouses Corinthians and Sao Paulo FC. In any other group, the odds could have been rather good to make a decent stage and even dream with progression.

Their boss, Leonardo Ramos, went bold and courageous enough as to field a three-man defensive line in which the most experienced member was the sweeper, Matías de los Santos, with just 22 years old. To the latter's right was Federico Ricca, 20 years old, and to the left was Cristian González, 18. When De los Santos was unavailable, Ramos picked Joaquín Pereyra, 20.

Training Athletic de Bilbao, Marcelo Bielsa used to say that, as a coach, it was cynical to field youngsters in order to expose and prove them unable to compete in tough scenarios. Well, in the case of Danubio, Cristian González endured a true nightmare in Montevideo trying to cover Corinthians' experienced striker Paolo Guerrero. The Peruvian himself had endured a difficult first half under the supervision of impressive Federico Ricca; by the second half though, Guerrero moved towards González and Corinthians finally found the path to victory in Uruguay. What did Leo Ramos do afterwards? He gave confidence to González and his young folks as undisputed starters for the subsequent matches.

Brazilian supporters of both Corinthians and Sao Paulo might cast my interpretation of Danubio as highly partial and over-romanticized as the Uruguayan side showed lots of dirtiness that went unpunished by apathetic referees. It is true. There is no innocence in their youth: with clenched teeth, more often than not the Danubio players indulged on unnecessary challenges and blatant aggressions which made many of them well-deserving of straight red cards. Killer children. Uruguayan ones who see in violence, either in physical, verbal, or in footballing terms, the only way to lift their club from the humbleness of the Uruguayan league and make it compete with South América's finest.

One feels he will regret not writing about the likes of Ricca, González and De lo Santos as they can well turn into the future Uruguayan centre-backs plying their trade in some European superclub. The same can also apply to the correct holding midfield duo of Fabricio Formiliano and Nicolás Milesi. Albeit Danubio is neither Peñarol nor Nacional (not even Defensor Sporting for that matter), notable former players include Marcelo Zalayeta, Álvaro Recoba and Edinson Cavani.

Danubio, the poorest and most loser side in Libertadores? Not at all, they are by far the most refreshing side in Libertadores and well worth watching them.

This Boca Juniors is new names, old ways

The 5-0 thrashing of Venezuelan Zamora FC in Buenos Aires gave a rash boost of confidence to a Boca Juniors squad which now, being seeded within an affordable group and having won all of their matches so far, aims towards the top post in this Libertadores's last 16. Paradoxically, the new names found in the current roster -Nico Lodeiro and Pablo Daniel Osvaldo protruding amongst them- play the old and ruthless ways that raised Boca to continental glory in the not so far past. 

The quintessential Xeneixe formula is as known as powerful: build reliable partnerships along the different bands no matter whether the tactical shape is a 4-4-2, a 4-2-3-1 or a 4-3-3.

In this vein, the Boca Juniors version that conquered Libertadores in 2007 is remembered for the two basic partnerships built both in the midfield and the attack. Then Boca coach, Miguel Ángel Russo, used to line up a holding duo comprised by protector Pablo Ledesma and creator Éver Banega; likewise, Juan Román Riquelme was positioned -at least nominally- within the same band as target-man Martín Palermo as an industrious Rodrigo Palacio tracked enemy full backs and wingers in the defensive phase. Bianchi's Boca in Libertadores 2003 worked similarly: the midfield partnership was formed by destroyer Sebastián Battaglia and regista Diego Cagna, while the attack featured loads of mobility with Guillermo Barros Schelotto plus Carlos Tévez. Those winning versions of Boca, like many others not as successful, based their ruthlessness over partnerships which enabled the squad to soak up pressure and kill on the counteroffensive.

Boca version 2015, managed by former caudillo Rodolfo Vasco Arruabarrena, isn't that different. Against Zamora, what appeared at first glance as a 4-4-1-1 with Lodeiro and Osvaldo given attacking freedom, was actually a well-drilled 4-3-3 that could circulate the ball towards the flanks in possession (as seen in Boca's third goal from left winger Federico Carrizo).

The new partnerships, however, have certain details of complexity. In the middle, Cristian Erbes acts as the man who protects Boca's defensive line with his positioning and Fernando Gago provides the passing guile on the left. More different is the role of the right midfielder, César Meli, who advances towards the space vacated by Lodeiro's cutting inside in order to feed Osvaldo through crossing. The nature of Boca's midfield determines the attack: the former Southampton and Internazionale forward stays central and the Uruguayan international comes inside to assume the classic number 10 role.

Arruabarrena must feel lucky his side's got some high-profile signings during the winter window which theoretically raise the quality from the same side that lost sorely in semifinals of Copa Sudamericana to archrivals River Plate a couple of months ago.

With the incoming players, Boca now raises greater expectations within a tournament whose format appears tailor-made for this club. Just consider that, with humbler rosters, Boca Juniors reached the final in 2012 and eliminated then reigning champions Corinthians in quarter finals in 2013. That's largely because this club has a blueprint of tactical cruelty and -you may want to call it- dirtiness. As mentioned above, their current group has proved manageable and a fortunate draw will surely place Xeneixes to compete until the very late stages. New names, old ways.

A very conservative Tigres side allows River Plate brilliance

    Marcelo Gallardo's side managed to overcome both their regretful turf and a clumsy goal allowed by poor defending to draw a match that represents moral victory. The usual narrowness of River Plate's midfield diamond, however, wasn't tested by a Tigres squad that resorted to a five-man defensive line in which the wing backs didn't attempt any overlaps, thus isolating an otherwise dangerous attack. By the final whistle, River had outplayed their opposition in everything but the score.

Tigres, which saliently is a more expensive team in terms of individual market value than River Plate, according to a Brazilian consultancy firm, is a club widely renowned in the Mexican media for its traditional disdain to Copa Libertadores. Although in fairness to Tigres, many Mexican sides share that disdain/incapacity at the international level being the case that, for instance, domestic hegemon club León endured an early elimination last year to Bolivia's Bolívar. Tigres boss Ricardo Ferretti, apparently fed up with these criticisms, selected a 5-2-3 formation full of South American expertise with Libertadores champions Ecuadorean Joffre Guerrón and Brazilian Rafael Sobis in attack, plus Copa América winner Egidio Arévalo-Ríos in midfield.
         

River Plate, on the other hand, resorted to its prototypical 4-4-2 diamond formation with Leo Pisculichi at the tip, flanked by shuttlers Ariel Rojas and Carlos Sánchez. Colombian striker Teo Gutiérrez and Uruguayan striker Rodrigo Mora formed the offensive partnership but, fundamentally, also drifted to the channels to provide the width given the lack of true wingers this system entails. Considering the inclusion of Matías Kranevitter in the place of Leo Ponzio as the lone holding midfielder, this River Plate side remains unchanged from the squad that lifted the Copa Sudamericana some months ago.

As one can tell from the head image, the game's main tactical feature was Tigres's Guido Pizarro, deployed usually as a holding midfielder alongside Arévalo-Ríos in the Mexican league, playing as the sweeper within a trio of center backs. On paper that should've cancelled the Gutiérrez-Mora threat (and it did at least in what refers to protecting Nahuel Guzman's inner box), but the Mexican wing backs, Torres Nilo and Jiménez, stuck extremely close to their own goal line. This in turn left the middle of the pitch available to the workings of Pisculichi and, more important, to the surprise upsurges of Carlos Sánchez, who must have equalised well before his impressive scissor kick found the back of the net.

With the midfield completely surrendered by Tigres (whose basic strategy for that zone appeared to be committing cynical fouls to stop River's passing) the home side almost reached excellence with the ball. The numbers are cold but trustworthy: River shot 21 times (seven on target); Tigres, 6 times (four on target). Possession went 65 percent versus 35 percent. Peculiarly enough, the Mexican club resembled the cautious tactics and the radically conservative approach that the Mexican national team employed at the World Cup against the Netherlands once it took the early lead.

Other South American teams, most notably Atlético Nacional de Medellín and San Lorenzo de Almagro, have used a combination of full backs, wing backs and wingers to stretch the offensive play and drag River's diamond out of position. Of course, those matches were finals themselves and, in this case, Tigres were more than happy with collecting the away point. As it is likely that both teams will make it past group stage, we'll have to wait to see if River can show this level of brilliance against more adventurous opposition.

Copa Libertadores's just found its own Atlético de Madrid

   Granted, most attempts to decode South American football tactics using European standards are simplistic and unfair to South American squads and their managers. But the Emelec side of Argentine-born Bolivian boss Gustavo Quinteros -who is to take over the Ecuadorean national team for Copa América- has some significant resemblances with Simeone's Atlético de Madrid. Most notably, their compact 4-4-2 formation, their patient approach without the ball and their use of a Diego Costa type center-forward: Miller Bolaños. That should make Emelec a tough rival in this Copa Libertadores and even a potential dark horse.

Emelec, current monarchs of the Ecuadorean Serie A, have so far outfoxed Universidad de Chile in Santiago for the opening match of Group Four (0-1), and outplayed Bolivian club The Strongest (3-0) for matchday two at home (played in Manta city due to renewal works of their George Capwell Stadium in Guayaquil). As one can tell from the above image against the Chilean team, they hardly modify their 4-4-2 formation both in possession and without it.

What makes their strategic approach extraordinarily similar to that of Atlético de Madrid is the bonus feature that Quinteros can deploy either natural wingers or inverted wingers (Ángel Mena, being left-footed, played the first match on the right flank while the second one he operated on the left) depending on depth-or-width necessities. Just like Arda Turan or Saúl Ñíguez in current versions of Atleti. Arguably, playing U de Chile away was best suited for a patient counter-attacking stance in which the wingers could occupy the interior zones left vacated by Bolaños and Luis Escalada's horizontal movement (as the Bolaños-Mena combination for the winner goal confirmed). The opposite stance, wingers providing width, worked brilliantly against weaker opposition in Manta.

In both matches, however, Emelec recorded lower percentages of ball possession and lower rates of pass success. This may indicate a preference for a more direct transition game in the channels as Pedro Quiñónez and Osbaldo Lastra, the holding midfield duo, actually lack passing accuracy.

The embedded vine above shows Bolaños's opener against The Strongest. Within the frame, one can observe Luis Escaladas's great cross from the right, which in turn was enabled by Mauro Fernández motoring forward in a quick counterattack from a corner kick. Outside the frame, nonetheless, one can't observe Bolaños's cynical tackle at the birth of that attack, taking down his marker while the referee was focused on the other side of the pitch. That defines Bolaños: a smart striker whose pace and dribbling abilities can turn him into an electric winger whenever the flux of play makes it mandatory, and a ruthless finisher whose gamesmanship turns him into the quintessential South American forward.

With two solid victories in a row, this Copa Libertadores's Atlético de Madrid stand a good chance to make it to the next stage. The doubts, of course, rise when one remembers that Quinteros will soon depart to take the Ecuador job. This may sound bad news for Emelec (and they are indeed), but given Reynaldo Rueda's cagey tactics in the World Cup, these can be great news for incoming Copa América.